Article 50, Globalisation and the real seat of power. The Top Table and The Trump Card.And the elephant in the room.

The Elephant In the Room.

Article 50, Globalisation and the real seat of power.
The Top Table, The Trump Card & The Elephant in the room.
A brief look at the hysteria in Liberal and Progressive chattering circles and it is hard not to feel concern for the anguish obviously felt by those afflicted by the idea, That Brexit, as Mrs May has kept telling us does indeed mean Brexit.
The story does not really start or end with Brexit though. If one thinks about Globalisation and the Global interconnectedness of Commerce and Trans Global corporations One has to stop and ask one’s self. Who is really in Charge? Ignorance of the answer to this question resides equally on both sides of the polarised question In short. “(WE)…´´ Like Benjamin Franklin,

´´every Day find Men in Conversation contending warmly on some Point in Politicks, which, altho’ it may nearly concern them both, neither of them understand any more than they do each other.´´

I have not seen it reported anywhere recently in the midst of the Article 50 fuss, that in 2014 the Institute for economic Affairs held a competition, The Brexit prize which awarded 100,000 pounds to the winning Brexit strategy. The winner was Ian Mansfield a foreign office Staffer based at the time in the Philippines, here’s a link to the winning Paper.

I found out about this competition from this book published in July 2016 Called Flexcit (an entry into the IEA comp as well I think), which comprehensively addresses all of the aspects of Brexit, The EU and The place in the world and Europe in the context  and Flavours ´´of the Global framework of institutions and Laws which Govern The conduct of International Trade´´.
The book is authored by


This Global 
Governance question seems missing again from the present discourse on Section 50, the context is much wider than the UK divorcing the EU, this is not a mere Marriage or even a menage a trios breaking up, this is more akin to a polygamous harem of the Ottoman Sultans involving some sort of internecine struggle between two of his, arguably high to middle ranking eunuchs, for more recognition or status.

The Global Governance context was something high on the agenda of the Brussels elites back in 2006 when A Breugel Policy brief entitled ´Global Governance: an Agenda for Europe´ was published to this addressee . (This Policy Brief builds on a paper prepared at the request of the Secretariat of the Economic Council of the Finnish prime minister. See “The EU and the Governance of Globalisation”, Bruegel Working Paper n° 2006/02, September 2006).

 The full paper is available at:
The full paper, only 8 pages long and worth a read may be found at this link.

´´Global institutions give a voice to countries of all sizes and are accountable to these countries. Critics may complain about the distribution of votes and seats and about the lack of effective accountability, but global institutions ensure a degree of fairness and ownership which most other solutions lack. Bruegel Policy Brief Global Governance: an Agenda for Europe.577´´
Dr North gives the full context at length starting his analysis with this.
´´Despite their utility, global actors are virtually unknown outside a narrow band of specialists, working within formal and informal structures which are rarely mentioned in, or even acknowledged by the popular media. Politicians and the media often have difficulty getting to grips with EU institutions and activities, and charting the activities of global institutions presents even more of a challenge. Few have any idea of the layers of governance over and above the sub-regional supranationalism of the EU.´


    1. The EU role in global governance Despite being a sub-regional entity, with its formal remit extending to only 28 countries of continental Europe, the European Union, its agencies and institutions play a considerable role in the globalisation process. The Union takes its mandate from Article 220 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. This requires the Union to “establish all appropriate forms of cooperation” with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the OECD.´´
The Drive of this paper is based upon the  more substantial book-length analysis by  Dr Richard North,  linked to by this web site.

The 406 page Flex report THE LEAVE ALLIANCE Flexcit A plan for leaving the European Union may be found at the link.

Reading through the Report over the past two days, I extracted these highlights which I think make the basis of a good thesis for the reality that Brexit need not be the disaster that the Hard of Thinking would urge those, the still Asleep, to believe it will be, or indeed that a ´Hard Brexit´is even a thing. That is not to say that Brexit is beyond cocking up, politicians of all stripes are always more than capable of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

One nagging question is, Who is the Sultan these two quarrelling eunuchs serve? Tackling that question is key to providing a context which dares not speak its name. Money is mentioned but not in the sense of its axiomatic relationship to Debt. There is in Dr Norths Flexcit a picture of the International Bank of Settlements in Basle. One department at the bank is mentioned

Figure 17: Bank of International Settlements, Basel. Host to the BCBS – one of the global regulatory centres of the financial services industry.

It is the ´´Basel Committee on Banking Supervision´´. The IBS is the Elephant in the Room, not just in our present quarrel but also in President Trumps quarrel with the Global Oligarchy Faction whose generalissimo is one George Soros. Mr Soros is similarly involved in various, many and nefarious enterprises rivalling the manifold interventions of which the CIA is so fond. “Talking bout a colour revolution oh yes, he just wants to change the world´´.

This is the real story not only of Brexit, the EU and  the Pigs But, of the Special relationship, the end of TTIP, NAFTA, Tarp, To Big to fail and too big to jail. A story roughly approximating to imperialism through debt based Fiat money. The Greatest Story Never told.

The Elephant In the Room.

At the end of my thesis of a Monetary Creation aspect to this question, I append the Passages and diagrams extracted from the Flexcit book which I found most relevant to the thesis that ´´Its the money creation, not the money´´, that identifies the Sultan. The sultan, is of course, the Financial Oligarchy.

Sections of the book on Energy policy and also other Trade matters are important and covered extensively in the book. One does wonder why Dr North does not dig into the Gnomes of Zurich(Basle) aspects as much as he is clearly capable of doing, and which I assume he has chosen not to. Dr North also writes convincingly on political devolution and of devolving democratic powers back to the local level, That is, I found it convincing but I am a natural member of that particular choir.
´´19.2 Improved local democracy

´´What applies nationally must apply locally. All politics is local, a former US
Speaker of the House, Tip O’ Neill, once famously said. He went on to say that
politicians must appeal to the simple, mundane and everyday concerns of those
who elect them into office.1143 It is those personal issues, rather than big and
intangible ideas, which most voters care most about, contradicting the notion
that, in local elections, people are casting votes to “send a message” to the
highest levels.´´

Debt instruments and private bank credit money is lumped in blithely as Financial Services Regulation by Dr Norths Thesis. Dr Norths Analysis stops short of examining privatised money creation. This aspect of the Euro competing with the Dollar and with Stirling or the Swedish Kroner And the subject of Petro-dollar hegemony is ignored almost as if the Bretton Woods post world war 2 settlement still applied and the Nixon Shock had never happened, let alone Big Bang in the City of London and Wall street the 80´s and all of that ´´Greed Is Good´´,  Gecko Stuff. Several Financial Crises still ongoing after of course the Big One 2008 and all of that.
To get up to Speed on the big one I recommend Charles Fergusons Oscar Winning Documentary Inside Job.


President Donald Trump with all of his rhetoric on reclaiming sovereignty and draining the swamp is equally heavy with the pregnancy of what is left unsaid regarding all of the same aspects of ignorance as to where the true power lies. The portrait of Andrew Jackson in the Oval office might indicate some hidden depths so far undiscovered and certainly unexplored by the Whitehouse press corps, those old enough to know better UnTeenaged scriblers.

In the money power, one sees the logic of the path to liberalisation and increasing debt. Bank debt money and its inverse relationship to the notion of national sovereignty is the unspoken tyranny, truly it is the last Taboo of the quarrel between the Financial Oligarchy sultans´ and its  two European Eunuchs, the Bank of England and The ECB. Mark Carney and Dr Scheubel should be centre stage, they of course in best wizard of oz traditions remain behind the curtain.


Dr Norths book gives a stunning analysis of the import of the ´Top Table´ argument as regards international trade. The upshot of the analysis is that
The UK is situated very nicely at the top Table of Financial Services and the EU is clearly jealous of Stirling’s role giving UK PLC,  a sort of ´´Fuck you money trust fund´´, which allows the sort of Independence a Private income affords to one.The sort of Trust Fund that the PIGS do not have which is a big clue to their continuing bondage.
The power play here is similar to the old British policy of keeping France and Germany in check by flirting with the Tsar. Bismark managed through Teutonic efficiency to hand Kaiser Wilhelm a winning hand which he managed to play all wrong. Perhaps that is what we now see with the Three Brexiteers and Mrs May, a very good hand which they simply do not know how to play, being ignorant of the  ´´Great Game´´ and Mis-using the ´Trump´ card, (
in true chinless wonder fashion.Certainly the House of Commons as a body has no clue how to play that hand as evidenced in this Famous (Little ´f´ and heavy sarcasm, shows.) debate sponsored by Steve Baker MP for High Wycombe.

The Top Table and The Trump Card.

Enlargement, The Euro, ERM Maastricht and all that.



In a piece called It’s the Money Stupid. Dr North has this to say.
´´A knowledge of EU history and of our troubled relations with the Community, however, will quickly draw attention to the early days and the “Bloody British Question”. And that will give some clues as to how the battle lines might be drawn up. The early disputes were, of course, about money, culminating with Thatcher’s great victory in 1984 at Fontainebleau on the rebate – more than a decade after we had joined the EEC. ´´
´´And, according to The Times, it has not been long in coming. Yesterday, Joseph Muscat, the Maltese prime minister, currently holding the EU’s rotating presidency, made it clear that the UK will have to sign up to EU divorce terms for Brexit. This included a bill of up to £60 billion, which will have to be settled before talks on a trade agreement can begin. 
This is exactly what we were saying on Wednesday and hinting at in December. But it also something the UK cannot pretend is a surprise. We were given notice by Wolfgang Schäuble last November. Mrs May was extremely unwise to ignore this issue. ´´
Recently it was the 25th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty, one wonders if The Then Mrs Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were really all in for fully integrated state monopoly financialised Capitalism.The Now Lord Lamont, an investment Banker it seems was not and had the rare economic knowledge of monetary history to save, Mr Major (a financial journalist) and the Nation,  from himself.and the would be  ECB and the then ERM Jekyll’s.
Norman Lamont was interviewed on the ERM Soros and All that recently on Sky News.

But Norman Lamont refused to sign it!
It was signed‎: ‎7 February 1992.
Became effective‎: ‎1 November 1993

“I hated the (Maastricht) Treaty.”
“When I looked at the Trade Statistics for Switzerland, I realised there was no unambiguous advantage for us being in the EU (in 1994).”
“The EURO has inflicted massive suffering & very low growth on Southern Europe. The EURO is a historic mistake.”

Norman Lamont on All out Politics, Sky News, 7th February 2017.

Lamont’s insights are rather more relevant to the current dispute than the current account balances between the UK and the EU.

If the Account is settled in Stirling it is easier than should it be settled in Euros but The Uk Government can buy sufficient Euros with Stirling at no cost to itself, it merely has to print the Cash at the Royal Mint in Llantrisant.
Or reinstate the provisions of the 1844 Bank Charter Act, and do it digitally.

´´the 1844 Bank Charter Act only stopped the creation of paper bank notes – it didn’t refer to other substitutes for money, such as bank deposits. Because of this oversight, banks could still create ‘bank deposits’ by making loans – and so they could still create money simply by opening accounts for people or companies and adding numbers to them.´´

So yes it is the money stupid but not in the way that Dr North describes, although for most UK and EU politicians that is the extent of their understanding, which is to be perfectly clear woefully inadequate.
This is why.
Krugman to Lietaer: “Never touch the money system!”
The current monopoly of conventional money is one of the main sources for unsustainable behaviours. New currency designs – among which crypto-currencies, but not only crypto-currencies ! – can contribute to make the necessary shifts more smoothly.
Lietaer designed the Euro and really knows about this stuff.

While at the Central Bank in Belgium (National Bank of Belgium) he implemented the convergence mechanism (ECU) to the single European currency system. During that period, he also served as President of Belgium’s Electronic Payment System. His consultant experience in monetary aspects on four continents ranges from multinational corporations to developing countries.
He co-founded one of the largest and most successful currency management firms; GaiaCorp, and managed an offshore currency fund (Gaia Hedge II) which was the world’s top performing managed currency fund during the 1987-91 period he ran it.[3] Business Week named him “the world’s top currency trader” in 1992.[4]


This brings to mind these words written by Bejamin Franklin. Alluded to in the first paragraph.

”There is no Science, the Study of which is more useful and commendable than the Knowledge of the true Interest of one’s Country; and perhaps there is no Kind of Learning more abstruse and intricate, more difficult to acquire in any Degree of Perfection than This, and therefore none more generally neglected. Hence it is, that we every Day find Men in Conversation contending warmly on some Point in Politicks, which, altho’ it may nearly concern them both, neither of them understand any more than they do each other.´´
In 1729 Benjamin Franklin wrote a pamphlet ´´A modest Enquiry into the nature and the necessity of a paper Currency.”
So that’s the Thesis and here are the extracts from Flexcit which are cogent to the money as debt aspects of Global Finance and Global Governance In Flexcit there are 30 mentions of money non about creation only 2 related to control mechanism but not of who creates it?!!!!!.WTF?
The Essence of Debt as the ultimate means of Social Control.


Extracts that caught my eye.

2.0 The negotiating framework
… we were helped by the fact that, towards the end of the negotiations,
journalists in Brussels had become thoroughly bored with the multiplicity of
highly technical subjects still under discussion and were ready to be content
with fairly superficial information.
Sir Con O’Neill
Britain’s entry into the European Community –
report on the negotiations of 1970-1972.
Results of an online survey aimed at young people, by Anglia Ruskin University and the Euclid Network, produced similarly poor results. Only seven percent admitted they knew “a lot” about the EU and just 12 percent felt that the EU impacted on their lives “very much”. Only a third of the respondents (34 percent) claimed to know the difference between the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council and the European Union.10 The degree to which ignorance of this principle pervades the “expert” and the political communities is quite staggering. Yet compulsory re-education is probably out of the question, and possibly of questionable effect when the former Prime Minister David Cameron still believes he cast a veto at the 2011 European Council to block a fiscal treaty.11 P.20
outcome is not a solution unless it has public support. Figure 3: Palais des Nations, Geneva. Home of the United Nations in Europe. Potential location for the Article 50 negotiations. (photo: Wikipedia Commons)
As Lord Denning put it back in 1974: The Treaty [of Rome] does not touch any of the matters which concern solely England and the people in it. These are still governed by English law. They are not affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back, Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is henceforward to be part of our law. It is equal in force to any statute.21
21 Lord Denning H.P. Bulmer Ltd v J. Bollinger SA [1974] Ch 401 at 418.
If we see “Brexit” as a process rather than a single event, the act of leaving becomes an enabler rather than an end in itself. In our view, the primary objectives of those managing the withdrawal are to set up the structures and strategies which will provide a sound foundation for the governance and development of a post-exit Britain. Crucially, we also need flexibility to react to change, and deal with the many unknowns that will emerge. For the immediate outcome, and in the years following an exit, we would be satisfied with economic neutrality – neither gain nor loss.
Trade offs, efficiency and robustness see Leitear and Taleb.

In all respects, therefore, a strategy based on an expectation that Britain can rely solely on WTO rules, without securing any direct agreements with the EU – and in particular without securing an MRA on conformity assessment, would not be well founded. Britain would struggle to maintain its current levels of external trade and there would be a profound adverse effect on daily life and P.47
What is so relevant to the current debate is that, at this point, the Community (now EU) was seen by Delors as one “house” in a village, alongside the EFTA “house”, with which decision-making could be shared. An EFTA ministerial meeting on 20 March 1989 sought to bring this vision to life, with the establishment of a joint High Level Steering Group, which concluded its meetings in the October.
    1. The unilateral WTO option This option eschews negotiations with the EU. Instead, it relies exclusively on the GATT/WTO framework to facilitate trade. It suggests that there should be no specific agreements with the EU and that trade relations should be regulated solely by reference to the diverse agreements made under the aegis of the WTO. This option has considerable support within the wider Eurosceptic community, where it is an article of faith that the EU would be willing to trade under these terms, and that it would be advantageous to the UK.66 The trade imbalance with the EU, it is argued, would preclude any predatory action (see: Figure 5 above).67 Whether this is a strong argument, though, is questioned by the Centre for European Reform (CER). It recognizes that the EU buys half of the UK’s exports while the UK only accounts for around ten percent of EU exports. Additionally, half of the EU’s trade surplus with the UK is accounted for by just two member states: Germany and the Netherlands. Most EU member states do not run substantial trade surpluses with the UK, and some run deficits with it. Those in deficit might seek to block UK imports. 68 P.€!


Over the last financial period, however, the funding was not one-way. Norwegian beneficiaries were paid €1.01bn from EU funds, making the sevenyear net contribution in the order of €620m, or about €90 million net per year. If the same pro-rata basis was applied to the UK after it had left the EU, it might be expected to find about €2.5bn annually in gross contributions, of which about 70 percent would be devoted to the EU’s research programme. In the Seventh Framework Programme, more than 2,350 Icelandic and Norwegian participants, including many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), were involved. Icelandic researchers contributed to 217 projects, receiving funding of nearly €70 million. The Norwegians took part in more than 1,400 projects, receiving €712 million. Both Iceland and Norway signed up to the successor programme, Horizon 2020.144 Budgetary costs attributed to EFTA run to 22,360,000 Swiss Francs (about £16 million), of which 55 percent is borne by Norway. This includes categories defined as EEA related activities, EFTA/EU statistical co-operation and EU/EFTA cooperation programmes. That, strictly, is the cost of Single Market Access which, on a pro-rata basis, would cost the UK less than £200 million per annum. 145

140 See: EEA Grants website:, accessed 7 June 2014. 141, and, both accessed 24 November 2014. 142 EFTA Bulletin, Guide to EU programmes, December 2010., accessed 15 May 2014. 143, accessed 2 March 2015. 144 European Commission Press Release 14 May 2014, 14-566_en.htm, accessed 15 May 2014. p.48

Norway, Switzerland EFTA and Incorporation of Eastern Europe Enlargement.

Enlargement and Nafta Comparison.( see other blogs)

Yet another possible option is the UK joining Switzerland to negotiate joint bilaterals, securing a better deal than Efta/EEA members. This combination has been called “Britzerland”, creating “a new outer tier of the European Union”. 153 A British application to Efta would then be welcome, as it would assist Efta to improve its relationship with the EU. In summary, a Britain willing to increase the leverage of Efta within the EEA would be welcomed. Britain seeking to join Efta as a camouflage for something else would create political problems within the organisation. 154
154 Björn Bjarnason, personal communication, 14 April 2014.
Oblivious to the flaws in the Open Europe work, however, when Capital Economics consultancy in February 2014 produced a NExit (Netherlands Exit) plan for Geert Wider’s Partij voor de Vrijheid, it argued for a version of the “Swiss option”, relying on the think-tank’s ideas to deliver reduced regulatory costs.157 The consultancy argued that, for every regulation transferred from Brussels to the Dutch legislature, costs could be reduced “in line with the difference in the benefit to cost ratios”. It then estimated the number of EU laws that could be repatriated and re-enacted as domestic law, and claimed savings of €326 billion (2013 prices) over the period 2015-2035.
The most important time for influencing the development of Schengen legislation is early in the Council’s decision-making process. This influence is expressed in working groups and committees under the Council, immediately after the Commission has put forward a proposal for a legal act”. Schengen member states, including Norway, it adds, participate by providing expert input in the fields concerned. The extent to which the efforts of each of the countries have an impact depends largely on the quality of the expertise provided and the arguments used. Norway has the same opportunities to promote its views as the EU member states. Mrs Tvinnereim asserts that people such as Eide are protecting their own positions. They need British EU membership to continue as “Brexit” would weaken the Norwegian establishment and vastly strengthen the No2EU campaign, especially if Britain joined EFTA.170 Senior Icelandic politicians agree with Mrs Tvinnereim. There, similar dynamics exist, with the “elites” seeking EU membership despite popular opposition.171 P.66
It is misleading, though, to assert that this lack equates with Norway being at a disadvantage when compared with the influence exerted by full EU members. 176 69 Such a claim presents a distorted view of the way Single Market rules are made. In fact, Norway exercises very considerable influence on EU legislation, to the extent that it sometimes sets the agenda. It also retains a veto – more accurately termed a “right of reservation” – set out in Article 102 of the EEA Agreement.177 EFTA countries in the EEA thus have the right to opt out of new EU legislation, a right that EU countries do not have.178
But the final word on “influence” must go to Helle Hagenau, International Officer of Norway’s “No-to-EU” campaign. Being outside the EU, she told this author, “Norway has kept its political independence both nationally and internationally”. This, she said, has been: … especially valuable in dealing with the United Nations. When the Norwegian government decides to promote a certain point of view at the UN General Assembly, we just do it. There is no need to negotiate with numerous other countries and an EU Commission, resulting in a watered down version of that message. Hagenau described an experience, about which we had also heard from Norwegian State Minister, Anne Tvinnereim. She recalled how, when she was a member of the official Norwegian delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York, she had both the Swedish and Danish delegations tell her that they had asked the Norwegians to present their case to the UN. They had been unable to do so themselves, constrained as they were by the “common position” within the EU.187
187 Interview with this author in Oslo, 2 August 2013. p.71.
Consider the Offshore drilling regulations arguments UK hamstrung. Norway not.

The Top Table Argument!

As to Britain’s voting power within the EU, most often agreements are reached by consensus. Where a vote is called, qualified majority voting (QMV) applies to the Council of the European Union (formerly the Council of Ministers). There, Britain has 29 out of 352 votes, representing eight percent of the vote (Figure 10). A qualified majority is 252 votes (73.9 percent).189 In the European Parliament, the situation is little better. There are 73 UK MEPs, and these represent a mere 9.7 percent of the 751 elected MEPs (post-2014 election). Given the party splits, this level of representation is notional. UK MEPs rarely vote together as a single bloc. Even if they did, they could never muster the 376 votes needed for a majority. Furthermore, the powers of the Parliament and the Council are limited in important but poorly recognised ways. The increasing number of laws come into being via international standards and these are most often implemented by the EU as delegated legislation (Commission Regulations) using the comitology procedure.190 Every year, more than 2,500 measures are processed via this route, passing through one or more of the 200-300 committees set up for the purpose. That is approximately 30 times more measures than are processed via the mainstream ordinary legislative procedure. The committees themselves are populated by anonymous officials from the member states, but they have no powers to amend or reject Commission proposals. They can either approve them, or refer them to the Council if they disagree with them.191 At Council, though, 70-90 percent of decisions are made by officials in the 160- plus preparatory bodies.192,193 These are known as “A-points” – colloquially the “A-list” – which are adopted by Ministers without discussion or a vote.194 189 Council of the European Union – voting calculator,, accessed 2 January 2014. 190 European Commission, Comitology Register,, accessed 18 December 2013. 191 Blom-Hansen, Jens (2008), The EU Comitology System: Who Guards the Guardian? Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics organised by the ECPR’s Standing Group on the European Union, 25-27 September 2008, Riga, Latvia., accessed 2 January 2014. 192 Council of the European Union. List of Council preparatory bodies, 202013%20INIT& 05%2Fst05581.en13.pdf, accessed 2 January 2014. 193 Olsen, Ingvild (2010), The Council Working Groups – Advisors or de facto Decision Makers? Paper presented at the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Porto, Portugal – 23-26 June 2010., accessed 2 January 2014. 194, accessed 2 January 2014. 73 Figure 10: Council of the European Union: qualified majority voting – national vote weighting. (source: Consilium) With Regulations made under acts passed before the Lisbon Treaty, the Council or Parliament can veto measures on certain grounds. 195 However, with Regulations made under legislation approved post-Lisbon, the veto no longer applies. The Commission is only required to “review” proposed regulations if there are objections, but it has no obligation to change them.196 . And, via the REFIT programme, the Commission is updating pre-Lisbon legislation, allowing it to eliminate the veto altogether.197 Britain (and Member States generally), with already limited power, are thereby weakened even more. Compared with the limitations of Mr Cameron’s EU top table, the post-Brexit contrast is remarkable. Alongside Norway and other EFTA/EEA members, Britain resumes its place on the global and regional “top tables”, and would be able to argue its own positions. When it comes to a vote, if the UK objects to a measure, it can either veto proposed standards or opt out of them. A 27-member EU, once the UK has left, would cast as many votes on international councils, but would have only one 195 Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny (RPS), Art. 5a, Council Decision 1999/486/EC,, accessed 18 December 2013. 196 Art. 11, Regulation (EU) No 182/2011,, accessed 18 December 2013. 197 European Commission, COM(2013) 685 final, 2.10.2013, Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, 2014/president/news/archives/2013/10/pdf/20131002-refit_en.pdf, accessed 18 December 2013. 74 veto – giving the UK an exact equivalence with the EU. Long before they come to the voting stage in the European Union, therefore, the UK could block proposals and make sure they never become law. Only if proposals get past this filter, and then have a mutually accepted Single Market relevance, would Britain – as an EEA member – have to consider adopting them. Even then, the States can also refuse to adopt EU law that they consider to be against their national interests. 198,199 This would put Britain in a relatively powerful position, far more so than it is within the EU where refusal to implement EU law would eventually trigger a reference to the ECJ, with the possibility of substantial fines.
6.6 Devil in the detail: workers’ remittances Another example of how varied the solutions to the migration problem can be is the issue of “workers’ remittances”. This is money sent by guest workers to their families in their home countries, forming an important source of development aid that is not always fully acknowledged. These remittances involve significant cash transfers. Between 1965 and 1990, when migrant flows had increased from 75 to 120 million, remittances to some countries exceeded foreign aid. Official remittances amounted to less than $2 billion in 1970 but had increased to $73 billion per year. The total value of remittances, including those via informal channels, was likely to be at least twice as high. 373 Thus, by 2005, the reported figure was $167 billion globally, dwarfing all forms of international aid combined. 374 In 2012, the total for the EU-27 was estimated at €38.8bn, almost three quarters of which (€28.4bn) went outside the bloc.375 Migrants in the UK sent nearly $4bn in remittances to India in 2011, compared with the $450m in UK aid it received that year. Bangladesh received $740m in remittances from the UK in 2011; its aid amounted to $370 million. In 2012, global transfers had topped $530 billion (£335 billion), according to the World Bank.376 Inasmuch as they are an effective, targeted form of aid, remittances perform a valuable role in economic development, narrowing the gap between host and 373 Making the best of Globalisation: Migrant Worker Remittances and Micro-Finance, 20-21 November 2000, ILO, Geneva,, accessed 21 June 2014. 374 006%29_English.pdf, accessed 9 July 2014. 375 FOCUS News Agency, 11 December 2013, Bulgarians working abroad transferred EUR 490 billion to Bulgaria in 2012, tm_campaign=Buffer, accessed 11 December 2013. 376 The Guardian, 30 January 2013, Migrants’ billions put aid in the shade,, accessed 23 June 2014. 120 recipient countries. Then, as a by-product of worker migration, they have the almost perverse effect – potentially at least – of reducing further migration. Even without that effect, though, they help stabilise less developed economies. In Senegal, they account for 11 percent of GDP. Disrupting these transfers can cause instability and economic hardship, potentially requiring direct and more expensive intervention in terms of international aid and even military action. However, several reports attest to significant market failures in transmitting funds to recipients, ranging from high transactional costs to the lack of banking facilities. In West Africa, charges on remittance transfers, levied by what amounts to a “duopoly” of money transfer operators, are the highest in the world at around 12.3 percent of sums remitted. If what is termed a “remittance super tax” on Africa was reduced to the global average of 7.8 percent, it could save the region $1.4-2.3bn a year. If reduced to the G8/G20 suggested level of five percent, the reduction would generate an additional $900 million.377 Applied to constructive uses, this could send 14 million children to school, almost half the region’s out-of-school population, give eight million people access to improved sanitation, or give 21 million people access to safe water. Yet, reports have been highlighting the excessive charging and other constraints on transfers for over a decade and despite repeated calls for urgent action, little has been done to remedy the problems. Arguably, this represents another failure (in part) of the EU and of the UK as part of the EU system. An independent UK might be better prepared to promote a more effective policy, taking into account known issues such as these, which appear to have fallen through the policy gaps.
    1. The role of global governance Global institutions give a voice to countries of all sizes and are accountable to these countries. Critics may complain about the distribution of votes and seats and about the lack of effective accountability, but global institutions ensure a degree of fairness and ownership which most other solutions lack. Bruegel Policy Brief Global Governance: an Agenda for Europe.577
E. External influence requires efficient internal governance The ability of the EU to act as a global player is often hampered by its inefficient arrangements for external representation and internal decision. Common external representation does not imply federalisation.
Member states can retain control rights through the definition of a mandate and the supervision of its implementation (Coeuré and PisaniFerry, 2006). But the reform of the EU’s external representation requires a definition of the ways in which various national views are mediated and the external representatives are monitored. There would be no point in aiming at more external influence while at the same time retaining an internal system that prevents the EU from reaching decisions. This highlights the need to renew the debate on constitutional arrangements. The current framework as it results from the Nice Treaty, including decisionmaking by qualified majority with a high threshold, does not combine the features of efficiency and legitimacy that are called for to address today’s and tomorrow’s global challenges.
Global institutions give a voice to countries of all sizes and are accountable to these countries. Critics may complain about the distribution of votes and seats and about the lack of effective accountability, but global institutions ensure a degree of fairness and ownership which most other solutions lack. Bruegel Policy Brief Global Governance: an Agenda for Europe.577
Despite their utility, global actors are virtually unknown outside a narrow band of specialists, working within formal and informal structures which are rarely mentioned in, or even acknowledged by the popular media. Politicians and the media often have difficulty getting to grips with EU institutions and activities, and charting the activities of global institutions presents even more of a challenge. Few have any idea of the layers of governance over and above the sub-regional supranationalism of the EU.
    1. The EU role in global governance Despite being a sub-regional entity, with its formal remit extending to only 28 countries of continental Europe, the European Union, its agencies and institutions play a considerable role in the globalisation process. The Union takes its mandate from Article 220 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. This requires the Union to “establish all appropriate forms of cooperation” with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the OECD.
A good example of the influence is the EU’s role in formulating the UN System of National Accounts (SNA), the internationally agreed system on which nations calculate their Gross Domestic Products (GDPs). Such statistical data are the meat and drink of politics. They are tools by which the real economy is described, the performance of which can make or break political parties and decide whether they win elections.
In terms of detail, over 33 percent of the acquis comprises “technical regulations, standards, testing and certification”. Much of this is implemented through standards bodies which will eventually emerge as ISO standards (about which we have more to say at the end of this section). Another 28 percent of the acquis comes into a category defined as “veterinary and phytosanitary matters”. This includes compositional standards for food and food safety. It is there that the hidden hand of globalisation is at its most powerful.
The OECD mechanisms are also recognised by the US government, with President Obama on 1 May 2012 having signed an Executive Order, promoting international regulatory cooperation.631 This had followed a Memorandum to promote US exports and trade through increased transparency and openness in the rulemaking process, issued the previous year by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).632 These mechanisms have already been given effect with a Joint Statement on 4 February 2011 from Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper and US President Barack Obama, creating the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC). This subsequently issued an Initial Joint Action Plan on 7 December 2011.633 That was strengthened in August 2014, with the publication of a definitive plan, setting out major new areas of cooperation.634
    1. Potential regional structures Looking for a completely different architecture, that avoids being Brusselscentric, we find that one has existed in embryonic form as a hierarchical arrangement, since 1948. It was then that Winston Churchill, with others, argued for the United Nations to be the “paramount authority” in world affairs, but with regional bodies as part of the structure. They would be “august but subordinate”, becoming “the massive pillars upon which the world organisation would be founded in majesty and calm”.653 Effectively, a New World Order would comprise a hierarchy of three tiers – national, regional and global. In the European context, this would include all the nations in continental Europe.
In the mind picture which it was possible to form as victory in the war became certain, there was the hope that each of these three splendid groupings of states and nations whose affairs of course would sometimes overlap, might have settled within themselves a great number of differences and difficulties, which are now dragged up to the supreme world organisation, and that far fewer, but also far more potent figures would represent them at the summit. There was also the hope that they would meet not in an overcrowded Tower of Babel, but, as it were, upon a mountain top where all was cool and quiet and calm, and from which the wide vision of the world would be presented with all things in their due proportion. As the poet Blake wrote:
Above Time’s troubled fountains
On the great Atlantic mountains
In my golden house on high.
To some extent events have moved in this direction, but not in the spirit or the shape that was needed. The western hemisphere already presents itself as a unit. Here at The Hague we are met to help our various Governments to create the new Europe. But we are all grieved and perplexed and imperilled by the discordant attitude and policy of the third great and equal partner, without whose active aid the world organisation cannot function, nor the shadow of war be lifted from the hearts and minds of men and nations. We must do our best to create and combine the great regional unities which it is in our power to influence, and we must endeavour by patient and faithful service, to prepare for the day when there will be an effective world government resting upon the main groupings of mankind.
    1. Foreign and defence policy
    2. Only strength can cooperate. Weakness can only beg. Dwight D Eisenhower

The essence of Britain’s departure from the EU is a celebration of nationalism, and a decisive rejection of supranationalism. Its status as a newly independent nation will permit a great deal of autonomy in terms of policymaking. In this and the following chapters that comprise phase four, we look at examples of key policies, and how they might develop in an independent UK. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but simply provides a snapshot, to illustrate the nature and extent of the task involved.


More usually, the EU works within the framework of the European Council, which it was able to do in response to the St Malo declaration. In June 1999, the Cologne European Council decided to give substance to the EU’s “Petersberg tasks”, framed in 1992 by eleven of the then EU member states through the mechanism of the Western European Union (WEU). The tasks covered humanitarian and rescue, peace-keeping and combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.709 At the Council, these were placed at the core of what was labelled the “European Common Security and Defence Policy”. The fifteen heads of government, along with the President of the European Commission, declared that: …the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.710 Similarly, in December 1999, the Helsinki European Council took the initiative further and agreed on the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). This was to be an EU-led military force able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year up to 60,000 personnel capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. Also agreed was a “Headline Goal” which set out the specific force components which member states agreed to contribute. Force commitments were outside the framework of the EU treaties.


    1. Agriculture The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) fails to adequately fulfil important societal objectives: to enhance biodiversity and climate protection, improve water quality, preserve scenic landscapes, increase animal welfare, promote innovative, efficient farming and fair competition in the internal market, and avoid harming farmers abroad. 2010 Declaration by Agricultural Economists721

The second policy we look at, in this fourth phase, is agriculture. The food and farming sector is important to the UK economy, with the whole food chain contributing £85 billion per year to the economy and 3.5 million jobs. 722 In policy terms, it is dominated by the European Union and its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Financially, this is the most important policy in the EU. It is also the most complex, made more so by the need to ensure conformity with WTO agreements. Currently, €57 billion, or 40 percent of the EU budget is devoted to agricultural support in one form or another. About €4.0 billion is expended on UK agriculture and related activities, which would cease on withdrawal, unless alternative provision was made. Cessation could create a significant problem. Farming leaders are thus nervous about the possibility of leaving, especially as the strongest advocates of EU withdrawal tend to be those most opposed to farming subsidies. However, while the EU average total subsidy is about 18 percent of farming income, Norwegian farmers gain just short of 60 percent, only just ahead of Switzerland, while Iceland farmers are paid just short of 50 percent.723 In other words, those European farmers who are outside the EU benefit from much higher subsidies than those within the European Union.




The chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, Martin Wheatley, states that his authority intends to “reflect on and embrace” the international nature of markets. He talks of a “new regulatory landscape” and of driving changes in regulation, infrastructure and culture, as a body at the “heart of international regulation”. His view is that the regulator exists “to drive forward a changing global agenda”. “You will witness first-hand how we share priorities with our EU and US counterparts, and how we are at the forefront of discussions to address cross-border risks”, he says.954

Such discussions require access at the highest level, well above the narrow subregional entity that is the EU. Despite it being positioned as such by David Cameron, the “top table” is quite simply not the EU. Occupying that position globally is the G20. Thus, when the EU sought to adopt a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) against British wishes, invoking the enhanced co-operation procedure, it was to the G20 that the financial markets representative bodies turned.955,956

This led in 2014 to the setting up of the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF) to act as the operational arm of the Global LEI System. It operates out of offices in Basel, Switzerland, home of the Bank for International Settlements. GLEIF also accredits and monitors the Local Operating Units (LOUs). These are the partner organisations which actually issue the LEIs to legal entities engaging in financial transactions.960 In the UK, one of the prominent LOUs is the Stock Exchange. It contributed to the development of the ISO, and is the UK’s National Numbering Agency for the provision and maintenance of financial reference data.961



When it comes to the UK withdrawing from the EU, the crucial thing is that the EU is a downstream organisation. It was not even on the ground floor. US interests as early as 2009 were pushing for the system but the idea was not endorsed by EU Internal Market Commissioner Michel Barnier until February 2011.962 “We must also work together in a common identification of market players”, he then said: “This is an area where the US is already committed, but that requires global standards”. 957, accessed 22 March 2016 958, accessed 22 March 2-16 959, accessed 22 March 2016. 960, accessed 22 March 2016 961 href=”, accessed 22March 2016 962 i-global-calls.pdf?n=65408, accessed 22 March 2016 315 This makes the point that the process of leaving will have a largely neutral effect on financial services regulation. The EU is not the originator of the system or the regulation. It is the law taker rather then the law maker. For the UK, outside the EU would make little difference. We would continue to shape and then adopt international regulation.

16.6 Free movement of capital and payments

Closely allied with, and an integral part, of the regulatory package affecting
financial services, but also much else, is the “free movement of capital”.
Originating in the 1957 Treaty of Rome as one of the four freedoms, it has been
re-enacted and revised, the current treaty (TFEU Article 63) declaring that: “all
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”. Furthermore, the article
states that: “all restrictions on payments between Member States and between
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”.
Britain, thereby, is deprived of a considerable element of tax sovereignty. It
cannot, for instance, demand that corporate earnings are retained in this country
until tax has been paid on them. Companies trading in Britain can offshore their
money and if, by so doing, they can convert it or manipulate it in some way as
to exempt it from taxation, they are free to do so.
Free movement of capital, however, is not an issue confined to the EU. Outside
the EU it is facilitated by the OECD, originally introduced in 1961 via its Code
of Liberalisation of Capital Movements. Although this is not a mandatory code
in a strictly legal sense, all 34 members nevertheless adhere to it as a price of
maintaining membership of the club.
Within the territories of EU member states, only EU law can give binding force
to the commitments endorsed in the code. Therefore, it is only used by the EU
for its external relations, where it is applied it to such countries as Turkey.
Furthermore, the EU provisions are “appreciably stricter than those in the
OECD”, making the EU “one of the world’s most open capital movement

However, for the first time in over half a century, the major economic powers
are questioning whether to reapply controls over capital movement – largely
because of issues of tax sovereignty and egregious examples of tax avoidance
by multinational corporations.
Even within the territories of EU Member States, though, G20 is taking the
global lead, working on a multilateral basis with UNCTAD.972 The aim of this
grouping is to resuscitate the IMF’s Articles of Agreement of 27 December
1945, which allow that “members may exercise such controls as are necessary
to regulate international capital movements”. A G20/UNCTAD report notes
that experience with the current financial crisis challenges the conventional
wisdom that dismantling all obstacles to cross-border private capital flows is
the best recipe for economic development.973
Within the EEA, Britain could not unilaterally implement any G20/UNCTAD
recommendations and re-impose capital controls – under normal conditions.974
Outside, it would be caught by the OECD Code, to which it is a party. This
again brings into high profile the increasing globalisation of regulation.
Removing one level simply exposes another.
One can compare Britain with the victim in a horror movie, trapped alive in an
as-yet-unburied coffin. Having broken through the lid in a bid to escape, he
finds to his consternation that there is another lid over the first. This “double
lid” in respect of capital movement is, on the one hand, the EU treaty
obligations and, on the other, the OECD code. The main effect of breaking
through the EU/EEA legislative layer is to reveal the second “lid”. As regards
relief from the “over-liberal” capital movement regime, the most optimistic
outcome is that G20/UNCTAD recommendations deliver revisions to the
OECD code, improving the ability of national treasuries to control capital

P.317 nad 318.

The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) The main internet regulator is the World Wide Web (abbreviated to W3) Consortium. Founded and currently led by Tim Berners-Lee, the consortium is made up of member organisations which maintain full-time staff for the purpose of working together in the development of standards for the World Wide Web. As of 10 April 2015, W3C had 397 members.

World Trade TTIP and Trump?
At the London School of Economics, Robert Basedow observed that “[the] predicted humble economic benefits of TTIP – a maximum of 0.5 percent of GDP – underscore that the agreement is primarily about setting the regulatory agenda of world trade for future decades. The underlying idea is that the American and European economies jointly represent such a large share of global GDP that third countries will emulate regulatory approaches taken under TTIP”. 1074 The number of politicians, officials, and experts who have made a similar assertion is impressive.

This notwithstanding, there is no certainty that a TTIP agreement will be reached. Progress is not going to be easy. Within the European Parliament and elsewhere, resistance to regulatory harmonisation is building. “In America, the prevailing impression is that EU consumer protection regulations only exist to keep American products off the European market”, says Green MEP Martin Häusling.1075

Some bilaterals, such as the TTIP and TPP, seek to rely on ISDS, which is regarded as an improvement on WTO procedures. But it is also described disparagingly as “a sort of offshore tribunal whereby private investors will be able to sue either the EU or US in front of a tribunal made up of fellow corporate lawyers if those jurisdictions introduce laws that could result in a loss of investment”.1085 This, plus other secretive aspects of the TPP agreement, has a Bloomberg opinion-writer dismissing it as a “corporatist power grab”.1086

When the State calls for defenders, when it calls for money, no consideration of poverty or ignorance can be pleaded, in refusal or delay of the call. Required, as we are universally, to support and obey the laws, nature and reason entitle us to demand that in the making of the laws, the universal voice shall be implicitly listened to. We perform the duties of freemen; we must have the privileges of freemen … Extract from the original Chartist petition, 18361140

19.2 Improved local democracy
What applies nationally must apply locally. All politics is local, a former US
Speaker of the House, Tip O’ Neill, once famously said. He went on to say that
politicians must appeal to the simple, mundane and everyday concerns of those
who elect them into office.1143 It is those personal issues, rather than big and
intangible ideas, which most voters care most about, contradicting the notion
that, in local elections, people are casting votes to “send a message” to the
highest levels.

In the UK, local government units – whether counties, second-tier districts or
unitary authorities – have no independent existence or powers. They are defined
through Acts of Parliament and owe their existence, their boundaries and their
powers to the diktats of central government. They are funded primarily from the
centre and the nature of monies which can be collected locally is directed by the
centre, as well as the amounts and terms of collection.
This, by any definition, is a top-down society. But it is also one which has
become increasingly so over time. Local elections are little more than opinion
polls on the performance of central government, without even the benefit of
random sampling techniques. There is no point in getting excited over the
election of local officials when almost the entire extent of their powers is
determined by national law.
Therefore, the aim must be to invert the entire structure of the British state.
Instead of the top-down systems, we need to start locally and create structures
built from the bottom-up. The fundamental building blocks of our democracy
should become independent local units which owe their existence to the people
who live within their boundaries. Instead of being statutory bodies – i.e.,
defined by statute, from which they derive their powers, under the control of
central government – they become constitutional entities. Their existence,
powers and revenue-raising capabilities are defined by the people via the
medium of constitutions, approved by local referendums.

At the heart of any government’s power is money. That is how parliament emerged as a force in the land, going as far back as 1215 when the tenants-inchief secured the first draft of the Magna Carta from King John. The concession that more than anything else reduced the power of the monarchy was the principle that kings were no longer entitled to levy or collect any taxes (except the feudal taxes to which they were hitherto accustomed), save with the consent of his royal council. He who controls the money controls the Monarch.

This is the “small government” which so many people profess to want, but even then – despite the local units being constitutional bodies – that does not guarantee freedom from central government interference. In the United States, there is constant tension between federal and state governments, and the constant encroachment of the centre. Here, as always, the currency of power is money. The federal government, with its own vast income stream – far larger than state revenues – is able to bribe States with cash inducements or bully them by withholding cash. p.368.

30 mentions of money non about creation only 2 related to control mechanism but not of who creates it?!!!!!



Author: rogerglewis Looking for a Job either in Sweden or UK. Freelance, startups, will turń my hand to anything.

25 thoughts on “Article 50, Globalisation and the real seat of power. The Top Table and The Trump Card.And the elephant in the room.

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