Oil Shock! or Ouile Quelle Suprise!
A CONVERSATION WITH JULIAN GRENFELLWASHINGTON, D.C.July 15, 1986Robert W. Oliver
“I was on a visit that he made to East Africa the summer
before ’66. We went from Kenya to Uganda. In those days, Milton
Obote was the President of Uganda ~- the first time around. I
remember George Woods, Abdullah El Emory, an Egyptian who was then
Director of the Africa Department of the Bank, George Wishart, a
Scotsman who was Woods’ personal assistant, and 1 had breakfast
together on the terrace of the Lake Victoria Hotel before Woods was
to go off and have a one-on-one conversation with Obote.
As we were having breakfast, he said to El Emory, “Tell me,
Abdullah, we haven’t lent any money to Uganda for a couple of years
because we have disapproved of the economic policies they were
pursuing. We couldn’t get any agreement on the terms of this and
that, We seem to be agreed that we should start lending again if
you’re convinced that there are good things we can lend for.” Then
he said, “How important is it politically that we resume lending?”
El Emory said, “It probably means the difference between Obote
staying in power and Obote going. If the World Bank does not
announce that it’s going to resume lending after your visit, this
is a real blow to a man.” Woods said, “Do we need to keep him in
power? Is there somebody else who could do the job better?” El
Emory said, “No, there is only the army. If you lose Obote, you
lose most of the good people who are with him at the moment, and
the army takes over.” Woods said, “Then I guess we’d better make
the loan. If he is the only guy who can really run this country
other than the army, I guess we’d better make him some loans.”
3
I was sitting there as a very junior staff member eating my
corn flakes and wondering, “My God, is this the way the Bank
operates?” But that was very much Woods. He would always get down
essentially to what was the critical political issue. He was much
talked about as a man. who knew only about investment — a sense of
what needed to be done in certain countries to get their economies
moving, but he was underneath it all a very political man. He
could see that if we do this, we keep the president of an
independent country in power. If we decline to do this we’re
probably condemning him to a revolution. He was a lot smarter than
people gave him credit for. I didn’t say that he was smart
necessarily in the sort of way which the President of the World
Bank ought to be, but he was politically very astute.”
Transcript of oral history interview with Ernest Stern held on March 2, 198317pp , World Bank Group Archives Oral Histories
BLAIR: I get the impression that the Brandt Commission was talking also about tone and style. I think they even said that the Bank was in danger of becoming arrogant. Do you take anything from this?
STERN: That’s always a tough subject. Of course, it’s always easy to find an arrogant staff member in any institution. I’m sure we have our share. All I can say, from my personal experience, is that in discussions with countries where the conditionality issue would be most prominent – that is, in our structural adjustment lending – I have found pretty strong support for what we suggest ought to be done. I’ve had a lot of personal discussions with Ministers and Senior Officials who welcomed the support of the Bank for the changes we have suggested. It helps them internally. We are in fact quite flexible as to the time schedules for actions to be taken and I would be really surprised if any of those countries felt that we were proceeding in a noncollaborative, or even a non-collegial way. There are other countries, clearly, where we have difficult relationships. Tanzania is one of them. There are other cases where countries have taken no action, where the economy is under severe pressure, where distortions are major and where somehow there is the perception that the Bank or IDA should lend anyhow. There, of course, you have a gap in understanding and that can lead certainly to the perception that we are pushing too hard, that we are being unrealistic and, maybe, that we talk from the top down. But, I think that one has to recognize that the resources we have are very difficult to obtain and we are, on the IDA side, very directly responsible to parliaments who have sometimes, as in the case of the United States, very difficult views about what is a useful aid project and how you go about lending. Even on the Bank side, we have to be sure that resources are well used and are repaid on time. Therefore, we cannot have significant operations in countries which simply refuse to face reality. So, it is perfectly possible that some of that perception is around. I don’t think that problem exists in countries where we have done highly conditional lending at a macrolevel. It does exist, I’m sure, in some other countries where we have come pretty much to the end of the road because of the unwillingness of those countries to take any of the necessary policy steps.
Grenfel and Stern both state diametrically opposed views as to the reception of and importance of the Brand and Pearson Commissions which is an interesting demonstration how briefing anonymously to the press by official sources is a lottery as to which views and policies prevail within any great institutions processes, we often forget that the throne is not itself secure unless the underpinnings of its processes are soundly supported by able and loyal officials, this true of any organisation, insert your own favourite Pretorian guard cliche.
I like this Grenfel Briefing Note.
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/252941389301412172/wbg-archives-1771349.pdf
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION lih( OFFICE MEMORANDUM 7 TO: Mr William Clark DATE: Geneva, 27 July 77. DECLAssiFID FROM: Julian Grenfell 1 NOV 302012 SUBJECT: Brandt Commission WBG ARCHIVES CONFIMIAL
Sweden : a little less activist since the change of government, but still much listened to;
Our friend Cabri6 of the Yugoslav delegation has told me that “certain Geneva-based people” are spreading the rumour around that Mr McNamara no longer has any interest in the Brandt Commission and is even against it now. He is quite likely referring to UNCTAD. I have told him that Mr McNamara still stands behind his original initiative, but the ball is now squarely in Brandt’s court. We will give all appropriate assistance but will certainly not create a situation in which it might appear that the Bank was seeking to control the Commission.
Vpn Hoek of ESA has been poor-mouthing the Commission here, and when he did it again at an inter-agency meeting last week I intervened to set him straight.
Some US delegates, including their no.2 on the ECOSOC delegation, have told me they feel a Brandt/Andy Young meeting in New York might be mutually
Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
I. Renaissance of the Brandt Reports
A Brandt New World? ……………………………………………………………………………………… 5
The Brandt Proposals: A Report Card……………………………………………………………… 5
Hunger……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6
Poverty …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6
Population…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
Women…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 9
Aid ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10
Debt ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..11
Armaments and Security ………………………………………………………………………………13
Energy and Environment………………………………………………………………………………14
Technology and Corporations………………………………………………………………………..16
Trade ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….17
Money and Finance …………………………………………………………………………………….20
Global Negotiations…………………………………………………………………………………….23
2002 Report to Stakeholders: Global Wealth without Globalization of Benefits……………..27
II. Breakdowns in Global Monetarism
International Banks and the First Debt Crisis: Latin America……………………………………..28
Foreign Investment and the Second Debt Crisis: Southeast Asia …………………………………31
Crisis Finance: Who Wants to be a Lender of Last Resort?………………………………………..33
III. The Dawn of Global Sovereignty
‘Globalization’: Short for Global Privatization………………………………………………………..39
Potential Revolution: Unleashing Global Demand …………………………………………………..41
Democracy International: Mobilizing for Global Development …………………………………..43
IV. Global Action Program
Common Agenda: New Global Round of Negotiations……………………………………………..47
Summit of Government Leaders: For an Emergency Relief Program……………………………48
Popular Referendum of the UN General Assembly: For the Restructuring
of the Global Economy ………………………………………………………………………………..53
Afterword
Earth in the Balance: The Vision of Willy Brandt ……………………………………………………59
Brandt 21 Forum……………………………………………………………………………………………………………63
The Brandt Equation © 2002 by James Bernard Quilligan. Grateful acknowledgment is extended to MIT Press
for permission to use published material from North-South and Common Crisis
The Committee of Twenty
Content and structure area
Scope and content
The Committee of Twenty (C-XX), formally known as the Committee of the Board of Governors on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues, was established by the IMF in 1972 to prepare a draft for a reformed international monetary system after the United States had announced in August 1971 that it was suspending the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The records in this series were compiled by Frank Vibert while he was working in the Policy Planning and Program Review Department (PPR) in the Office of the Vice President for Development Policy (VPD). The records primarily concern two of the Committee’s Technical Groups: the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources and the Technical Group on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Link and Related Proposals. The Bank was asked to participate in the secretariat function for the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources, and Frank Vibert with Azizali Mohammed from the IMF formed the secretariat for the Group. Earnest Stern, Senior Adviser in VPD, was part of the Technical Group on the SDR Link.
The series contains copies of IMF and World Bank studies and other documents that were used as background materials for the Committee or that were drafted in response to specific requests from Committee staff; drafts of and comments from IMF and Bank staff on the Bank paper, Capital Flows to Developing Countries, that was prepared for the Committee; and the issues of the IMF newsletter, IMF Survey, that included articles regarding the Committee of Twenty. The files include: copies of President McNamara’s correspondence with Ernest Stern and with C. Jeremy Morse, the chair of the Deputies of the Committee of Twenty; memoranda exchanged between Vibert and Stern; intra-VPD correspondence and other intra-Bank correspondence relating to the Committee of Twenty and the Technical Groups; Vibert’s correspondence with IMF staff and with the chair of the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources; copies of memoranda Vibert drafted for the chair’s signature; and Vibert’s copies of Stern’s memoranda to the files regarding the SDR Link.
Records maintained for meetings of the Technical Group on the Transfer of Real Resources include: Vibert’s correspondence relating to pre-meeting planning, copies of documents provided as background for the meeting discussions, lists of attendees, copies of the Terms of Reference for the Group, and Vibert’s handwritten notes form the meetings. The files also contain multiple drafts and comments on the drafts of the Group’s report.
Records relating to the Technical Group on the SDR Link include copies of World Bank and IMF documents provided the Group as background materials; copies of statements regarding the SDR Link made by heads of delegations to the Group; notes regarding SDR discussions with the United Kingdom and Germany; and various drafts of the Bank paper Bank Group Uses of SDR Link Resources.
Robert McNamara
 |
This article possibly contains original research. (May 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) |
| Robert McNamara | |
|---|---|
 |
|
| President of the World Bank Group | |
| In office April 1, 1968 – July 1, 1981 |
|
| Preceded by | George Woods |
| Succeeded by | Tom Clausen |
| 8th United States Secretary of Defense | |
| In office January 21, 1961 – February 29, 1968[1] |
|
| President | John F. Kennedy Lyndon Johnson |
| Deputy | Roswell Gilpatric Cyrus Vance Paul Nitze |
| Preceded by | Thomas Gates |
| Succeeded by | Clark Clifford |
| Personal details | |
| Born | Robert Strange McNamara June 9, 1916 San Francisco, California, U.S. |
| Died | July 6, 2009 (aged 93) Washington, D.C., U.S. |
| Political party | Republican (until 1978)[2] Democratic (1978–2009)[2] |
| Spouse(s) | Margaret Craig (1940–1981) Diana Masieri Byfield (2004–2009) |
| Children | 3 (including Craig) |
| Education | University of California, Berkeley (BA) Harvard University (MBA) |
| Signature |  |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance |  United States |
| Service/branch |  United States Army |
| Years of service | 1940–1946 |
| Rank |  Lieutenant Colonel |
| Unit |  U.S. Army Air Forces |
McNamara remains the longest serving Secretary of Defense, having remained in office over seven years.World Bank President[edit]
George David Woods
| George Woods | |
|---|---|
| President of the World Bank Group | |
| In office January 1, 1963 – April 1, 1968 |
|
| Preceded by | Gene Black |
| Succeeded by | Robert McNamara |
| Personal details | |
| Born | July 27, 1901 Boston, Massachusetts, U.S. |
| Died | August 20, 1982 (aged 81) Lisbon, New York, U.S. |
Biography[edit]
World Bank Service[edit]
GRENFELL: Yes. I remember him saying at the time that he felt that this was a very good way of recycling the petro dollars, but that • • 25 you had to keep an eye on it because commercial debt could build up as fast and even more expensively than public debt. It occurred to me that he had a very good understanding of what the implications were of the build up of the debt. I think the figures around about that time were that the developing countries as a whole were devoting about 33 percent of all their external resources, funds coming in, on servicing the public debt. He saw the writing on the wall. That was certainly behind his major push to get a huge second replenishment of IDA. It didn’t work, of course. He asked in ’66 for a billion dollars, and he got only 400 million, which was a big disappointment to him. But the reason why he said we must do this, why we must to have this quantum leap in resources for IDA, was very largely because he was worried about the debt structure of the developing countries. Clearly there were a lot of them who needed loans on highly concessionary terms, so in the midst of the debt crisis that we are in now, I look back and think that he had a lot of foresight. He could see it coming when a lot of other people were really not that concerned about it.
OLIVER: The Friedman concept of the IDA replenishment was also 3-4 billion dollars, at least half of which Irving thought should accrue on highly concessionary terms. He pushed for half of that which is where the number $f billion comes from. This was clearly enunciated at least 2 years earlier than the Stockholm speech.
GRENFELL: Yes, it certainly preceeded that at least 2 years earlier. I think the Stockholm speech was saying, “Look I am 26 leaving the Bank. This is my last major public pronouncement. For Gods sake, listen. This is what is going to happen.” The enthusiasm for the grand assize, which at that time they thought Oliver Franks was going to head, was very much rooted in his, as I say, writing-on-the-wall syndrome. He thought that things could easily get out of hand. He understood very clearly what people like Edward Boyle, and Barbara Ward, and Rene Mayer, and William Clark were saying to him which was that this development decade has run out of steam. The money that is going in is simply not doing the job. It’s raising GNP, standard of living, but it’s not having much impact on poverty. I think he understood that quite clearly.
Economic Transformation: The Commons and Integral Capital
This show continues a big picture emphasis from the first two weeks, with further exploration of the strengths and limitations of our current economic/financial system—an understanding of which is central to realizing desirable and sustainable futures. The show explores the “market state” as we know it, and considers the chronic instability and inherent conflict at play between the private and public sectors—which in many respects pits freedom against equality. James Quilligan introduces a view of the future built upon an expanded perspective of the commons and integral capital —which includes explicit recognition of private capital, public capital, commons capital, and personal capital—and how they come together as a platform for future transformation. The show begins to intentionally showcase the relationship between systems, structures, and behaviors (the exterior forms of life) and the many dimensions of culture and mindsets (the inner nature of life) that inform them.
Economic Transformation: The Commons and Integral Capital
Hosted by John D. Schmidt
Guess: James Quilligan
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