#Agenda2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals, #Stalinism and the Isle of Dogs Neighbourhood Plan? #5G3DMarxism @SteveReedMP @MayorJohnBiggs @MayorofLondon @BorisJohnson @financialeyes @emptyhomes @RobertJenrick @devilskitchen @RichardDesmond @Andrewwood17 #WrongKindofGreen

Anti Homes Community Plan

Anti Homes Community Plan

unnamed (1)


IOD Model Westferry Printworks

IOD Look South

Westferry Master Plan Overview

Westferry Acton comparesheet




Forum Secretary and local Councillor, Andrew Wood explained: “The formal policies in the Plan, which now  must be enforced by the Council, cover the strains on our infrastructure, the use of empty sites, construction management and communication, sustainable design, resident votes on estate redevelopment, and 3D models for high rise planning.  Other policies that had been in the previous Plan, but which the Examiner felt did not technically fulfil the statutory tests required of formal planning policies, are now set out separately as the aspirations and recommendations of the community.”





A3 – Summary of CIL Recommendations
CIL – All Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) generated in the Area should preferably be invested in
the Area, or at least be of direct benefit to the Area, and on the works and priorities identified in the
OAPF’s Development Infrastructure Funding Study (DIFS).

3.1 The Isle of Dogs is experiencing unprecedented residential development density, with many
large and closely packed residential buildings being built and proposed by multiple developers.

3.5 The official Infrastructure evidence is that supporting the Local Plan (Infrastructure Delivery
Plan) and the OAPF (Development Infrastructure Funding Study). The Forum’s Evidence Base –
see website – includes a summary table of recent Tower Hamlets Council Strategic Development
Committee reports in the E14 post code area.9

These Committee reports set out for Councillors
on the Committee as well as stakeholders the key issues and policies for consideration before a
decision is made. As can be seen from the examples, they generally do not mention
Infrastructure in any great detail, nor the Infrastructure planning documents, including the GLA’s
Isle of Dogs and South Poplar Opportunity Area Planning Framework (OAPF) or the LBTH
Infrastructure Delivery Plan. This is why an Infrastructure Impact Assessment as required by
Policy D1 needs to be provided, so that Councillors and stakeholders have access to
comprehensive, up to date, and meaningful Infrastructure information in properly assessing
relevant applications.
3.6 The Forum’s Evidence Base includes a summary table of four developments in the Area
approved by the LBTH Strategic Development Committee (or later by the Mayor of London or
through a Planning Appeal) since the Forum was first set up in autumn 201410. It details for each
development the size, density, height and any Infrastructure to be provided on site, including
child play space. It shows that a number of developments did not provide any Infrastructure on
site, but that others – especially more recent developments – have provided some
Infrastructure. It shows that wider Infrastructure considerations are not generally being
See the Forum’s Evidence Base, map at paragraph 5.2.2 at page 48
See the Development Infrastructure Funding Study (DIFS), at page 5

See the DIFS, at page 20
See the Forum’s Evidence base, at page 40
10 See the Forum’s Evidence base, at page 42



Click to access Isle-of-Dogs-and-South-Poplar-OAPF-draft-Infrastructure-Funding-Study-9-May-2018.pdf



Click to access Isle-of-Dogs-and-South-Poplar-OAPF-draft-Infrastructure-Funding-Study-9-May-2018.pdf








Policy DF1 Delivery of the Plan and Planning Obligations A Applicants should take account of Development Plan policies when developing proposals and acquiring land. Development proposals should provide the infrastructure and meet the other relevant policy requirements necessary to ensure that they are sustainable and to support delivery of the Plan. It is expected that viability testing should normally only be undertaken on a site-specific basis where there are clear circumstances creating barriers to delivery. B If an applicant wishes to make the case that viability should be considered on a site-specific basis, they should provide clear evidence of the specific issues that would prevent delivery, in line with relevant Development Plan policy, prior to submission of an application. C Where it is accepted that viability of a specific site should be considered as part of an application, the borough should determine the weight to be given to a viability assessment alongside other material considerations, ensuring that developments remain acceptable in planning terms. Viability assessments should be tested Draft London Plan – consolidated changes version – Clean July 2019 rigorously and undertaken in line with the Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG. D When setting policies seeking planning obligations in local Development Plan Documents and in situations where it has been demonstrated that planning obligations cannot viably be supported by a specific development, applicants and decision-makers should firstly apply priority to affordable housing and necessary public transport improvements, and following this: 1) recognise the role large sites can play in delivering necessary health and education infrastructure; and 2) recognise the importance of affordable workspace, and culture and leisure facilities in delivering good growth. E Boroughs are also encouraged to take account of the infrastructure prioritisation in Part D in developing their Community Infrastructure Levy Charging Schedule and determining the infrastructure that will be funded through borough CIL.

11.1.1 The purpose of planning is the delivery of sustainable development, and the
statutory basis for this is the plan-led system. The policies in the London Plan
have been subject to a viability assessment which has tested the cumulative
impact of relevant standards, obligations and requirements to ensure they do not
put implementation of the Development Plan at serious risk. Local Development
Plan Documents are also subject to viability testing. Therefore, applicants should
take account of all relevant Development Plan policies when forming their
proposals and when acquiring land. Land owners should also take account of
these requirements when applying for planning permission or selling sites.
11.1.2 The assessment of viability on a site-by-site basis has caused uncertainty,
increased land prices and undermined the delivery of Plan objectives. There are
inherent difficulties in the assessment of viability at the application stage given
input uncertainty and the sensitivity of viability appraisals to small changes in
assumptions. There is also a risk that site-specific viability testing is used as a
device to reduce planning requirements and enhance commercial returns, even
where genuine barriers to delivery do not exist.
11.1.3 To avoid these issues, it is expected that the testing of viability of a specific
scheme should only be necessary where there are clear barriers to delivery that
would make the delivery of obligations unviable. This will speed up the planning
process and increase certainty for applicants and planning authorities, whilst
supporting the implementation of planning policies and the delivery of sustainable
11.1.4 In setting Local Plan policies and associated guidance, boroughs should consider
whether there are circumstances in which it may be acceptable to review the
Draft London Plan – consolidated changes version – Clean July 2019
viability of a development on a site-specific basis. These may include
circumstances where an applicant is required to provide significant infrastructure
improvements to facilitate delivery of a development (beyond the level that would
typically be required for the scale of development)146A, or where the value
generated by a development would be exceptionally low.
11.1.5 If an applicant wishes to make the case that viability should be considered on a
site-specific basis they should inform the borough, and Mayor where relevant,
prior to submission of the application. Evidence should be provided of the specific
issues that would prevent delivery in line with relevant Mayoral and borough
policies and guidance. The application should be determined in accordance with
the Development Plan, with the decision-maker determining the weight to be given
to viability alongside other relevant material considerations. This should ensure
that proposals remain acceptable in planning terms.
11.1.6 The Mayor’s Affordable Housing and Viability SPG sets out detailed guidance on
the assessment of viability. Viability should be assessed robustly in line with the
Mayor’s guidance when undertaken on a site-specific basis.
11.1.7 This policy should inform the development of plan policies, infrastructure planning
and planning decisions.

11.1.17 In the London Housing Strategy, the Mayor has set out how he will ensure that all
sources of housing supply are utilised, how he intends to use the tools he
currently has available to their fullest extent, and what extra powers and resources
London would need to achieve a significant and sustainable step change in the
delivery of new and affordable homes.
11.1.18 At the core of the London Housing Strategy is an understanding that the current
model for homebuilding in the capital faces inherent constraints in terms of how
many new homes it can support. These include capacity constraints of major
homebuilders, and economic limitations on how quickly market homes can be sold
at the prices developers want to achieve. Raising homebuilding toward the targets
set out in this London Plan will require the contribution of existing players to be
supported, and to be complemented by a significant expansion in the range of
delivery models used, and the tenures and types of homes delivered.
11.1.19 In order to accelerate and / or de-risk housing development in the capital the
Mayor is already making funding available, and he has secured £ 4.82 billion to
support 116,000 affordable housing starts by 2022. He is also working to secure a
significant share of the Government’s Housing Infrastructure Fund, and has made
a number of bids to unlock key housing schemes across London.
11.1.20 Beyond this, the Mayor is making the case to Government for continued and
sustained investment in homebuilding and enabling infrastructure. Initial estimates
by the GLA indicate that at least £2.7 billion in public capital funding a year is
required for affordable housing to help address housing need. This estimate will
be revised based on discussions with affordable housing providers and more
detailed analysis of the costs of provision.
11.1.21 Beyond his investment and planning powers, the Mayor is also proposing a more
hands-on approach to increasing the supply of land for homebuilding. He intends
to intervene directly, or support boroughs, housing associations and developers to
do so, where land is suitable for new housing but is not coming forward for
11.1.22 In relation to publicly-owned land, the Mayor’s functional bodies have committed
to ensure that land they control is utilised to support additional housing delivery.
There is also a significant stock of land in the ownership of other key public-sector
landowners. The Mayor is engaging directly with them to bring forward sites for
Draft London Plan – consolidated changes version – Clean July 2019
housing, and is also working with Government to develop a more formal role for
the GLA in bringing forward Government-owned land in London earmarked for
housing delivery. As a minimum, this role should mirror that operated by Homes
England, which directly manages the release of surplus Government landholdings
outside London.
11.1.23 As a last resort, statutory powers may be required to bring forward land for
development. The Mayor will work with boroughs, Mayoral Development
Corporations, TfL, housing associations and developers to utilise statutory land
assembly powers, such as Compulsory Purchase Orders, to bring forward housing
opportunities. This will include supporting boroughs to make more use of
compulsory purchase where appropriate, and the Mayor exercising compulsory
purchase powers where a scheme is of strategic significance, or where a borough
may be unable or reluctant to act. To support a step-change in the delivery of new
and affordable housing, the Mayor is making the case to Government for further
reforms of, and resources to support, compulsory purchase, and exploring options
for new land assembly models.
11.1.24 The homebuilding industry needs to be diversified to increase capacity and speed
up delivery. The Mayor is supporting the Build to Rent sector, which can provide
additional supply above what would be delivered through the sale-led housing
market. In order to encourage small and medium-sized builders the Mayor is
launching a Small Sites, Small Builders programme, which, alongside changes to
CIL and new planning policies, seeks to address some of the barriers faced by
smaller builders. The Mayor is also supporting boroughs and housing associations
to deliver more homes directly, including by providing investment and lobbying
Government for reforms to enable boroughs to build at significantly greater
11.1.25 Finally, the London Housing Strategy sets out how the Mayor will address the
capacity constraints that are holding back the industry. This includes addressing
the construction skills crisis by investing in a new Construction Academy Scheme,
utilising the devolved Adult Education Budget, ensuring that local labour and
apprenticeship opportunities are made more efficient and joined-up, and
supporting the substantially greater use of precision manufacturing in building
homes across London.

Potential Options for Raising the Required Funding
Fiscal Devolution
11.1.58 Delivering London’s required strategic infrastructure and housing demands
significant investment of public sector funding. Because the UK possesses a
comparatively centralised distribution of fiscal powers, substantial proportions of
the total cost of strategic infrastructure tend to be funded through fiscal transfers,
issued by the Treasury. This often leads to significant uncertainty over the
outcome of a proposed project, and delays in funding being agreed. In recognition
of the challenges this can create for industry, businesses and Londoners, the
Mayor is committed to ensuring that London has more control over its own
11.1.59 London is the world’s largest financial centre, and has one of the largest
metropolitan GDPs. It is a vital component of the UK economy, driving growth
across the country. London contributes significant amounts of the UK’s tax
Draft London Plan – consolidated changes version – Clean July 2019
revenue and is a net contributor. In 2015/16 it contributed £136.7 billion, which
was more than the total public expenditure devoted to London that year (£110
billion), generating a net fiscal contribution of £26.7 billion. To ensure that London
continues to contribute in this way to the national economy, it is vital that the
capital’s required infrastructure and housing is delivered to support the city’s
economic growth, and ensure it remains a pleasant and healthy place to live, work
and visit.
11.1.60 The Mayor believes that fiscal devolution is required to help ensure that London
can deliver this vital infrastructure efficiently and to budget. The London Finance
Commission report published in 2017 sets out the options and rationale for
devolution. Devolution to London would allow the city’s government to develop
bespoke policy for its citizens and manage its budget efficiently across areas of
policy, rather than be tied to a mix of funding streams channelled through
government departments and other agencies.
11.1.61 The London Finance Commission recommended the full devolution of property
taxes, including council tax, business rates and stamp duty, as well as permissive
powers to develop new mechanisms, subject to consultation. This would allow for
the development of a consistent approach with Section 106 payments and the
Mayoral and borough CIL. This devolved approach would help London to deliver
major transport, and other capital investments, as well as taking the lead in
solving its own housing problems.
11.1.62 The success of the UK economy depends increasingly on the success of our major
cities. The Mayor recognises fiscal devolution as a national agenda, rather than a
priority exclusively for Londoners, and is working with combined authorities across
the UK and with newly appointed Metro Mayors, to promote devolution across the
Sharing In Land Value Uplift
11.1.63 Successful infrastructure systems benefit everyone in the city, and so it is logical
that it is not direct users alone who fund them. All beneficiaries, such as road
users, businesses, and home owners should contribute to funding transport and
other infrastructure according to the benefits they receive, the external costs their
use of it generates – such as congestion and air pollution – and their ability to pay.
11.1.64 Major transport investment can significantly increase the value of land, particularly
if it is close to a train station or transport hub. Land value capture is a term used
to describe the use of this increase in land value to fund investment in public
services, such as transport. In 2017 the Government announced a taskforce155A to
investigate a new way of paying for infrastructure projects, such as new public

155A The taskforce is led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Mayor of
London’s Office, and includes HM Treasury, the Department for Transport, TfL and London Councils.
Draft London Plan – consolidated changes version – Clean July 2019
transport, including via land value capture. The Government asked the taskforce
to look at the so called ‘Development Rights Auction Model’ of land value capture.
TfL prepared a report, which studied the model in detail, and found that it would be
unlikely to raise significant funding in London.
11.1.65 There are a range of other infrastructure investments and interventions that can
increase the value of land, and other options for capturing land value uplift. The
Mayor will continue to work with government to explore all avenues for ensuring
Londoners receive the vital infrastructure required to support growth.
11.1.66 Through this Plan the Mayor is determined to tackle the housing crisis and support
London’s continued growth in a sustainable and inclusive way. This chapter has
set out how the funding gap must be met if the infrastructure to support growth is
to be planned and delivered at the right time. The step change in housing delivery
that London needs cannot happen without it. The Mayor needs new fiscal tools to
fund this infrastructure. Where it can be funded privately, he requires a supportive
regulatory regime so that it can be provided when needed.
11.1.67 A successful London economy benefits the whole of the UK, so there is a strong
case for devolving control over resources to the Mayor to enable greater
investment in infrastructure. Local, city-wide, and central government need to work
together with the private sector to identify creative and innovative ways to deliver
the infrastructure in London that will unlock growth and new homes.



4 Land Value Capture

1.2 This is a complex subject that POS considers needs to be considered in a holistic
and systematic manner. The starting point is to remind ourselves why we take
money from developers. The main reasons are:
• To mitigate the impact of development: eg a new junction or school
• To deliver policy: eg affordable housing
• To fund necessary supporting infrastructure: eg Crossrail

2. Land Value Capture: we sometimes capture the increase in land value
resulting from public investment via a localized tax of some form like TIF or
Mayoral CIL. We also tax land value in various sporadic ways (capital gains
tax, stamp duty, inheritance tax etc). But can we do this more effectively by
capturing the increase in land value generally over time.

2 Development process: brownfield
2.1 In most cases S106 & CIL come from the value created by the development
process rather than the land value. It is important that land values are not
encouraged to rise by including S106 and CIL as additional costs on development
rather than the intended reduction in land values thereby reduce the ability of the
development process to fund planning obligations, CIL etc. Unfortunately this
happened as a result of para 173 in the original 2012 NPPF. It said:
To ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to
development [eg CIL & S106] when taking account of the normal cost of
development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land
owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable.
2.2 This gave developers the confidence to overpay for land, safe in the knowledge
that they could argue a viability case and the planning system (usually affordable
housing contributions) would subsidise this profligacy. The table below (produced
by BNP Paribas) illustrates this:



And how about this for a slam dunk doozy!

4.2 Taxing property and especially land should be considered. Assets were taxed
long before income and most economists agree that as a form of progressive
taxation it’s a good one. Past problems of valuation complexity could well be
resolved with Big Data and Artificial Intelligence – Zoopla probably sets local
property prices more efficiently and more accurately than the estate agency
industry does! Concerns from people who are asset rich but income poor can be
addressed by designing the payment regime to suit people’s circumstances. The
tax can be paid annually, upon a property transaction event or as part of the
estate’s probate process.

By this point it should be clear that the environment is hostile to Private enterprise free market development and designed to promote renting over home ownership? Why?

UN Sustainable development goals, Agenda 21 and Agenda 2030 run through all of these policy framework developments, it is quite clear that a guided policy narrative is discenable from the vector , derailed by Brexit and The election of President Trump.

In the London Plan, and the inspectors report both refer to compliance with EU regulation and we have to ask why?

Here’s a clue..


Most cursory students of government will understand our current structures rather similar to this diagram:

In the current model:

However, for governments with an internationalist agenda, these reforms also proved fortuitous in other ways.In we take account of structures outside of the UK, the world works rather more like this:

In this model:

Everything is a remix (of sockpuppetry)

The corruption of local politics was a central reason for the ever-increasing centralisation of government—especially under the Conservatives in the ‘80s. Further, for Thatcher’s government—fighting wars on multiple fronts e.g. the unions) whilst requiring swift, radical change (to bring the economy back from ruin)—centralising power meant that reforms could be made faster and with less local oversight (but I repeat myself).

Sock puppet Localisation in the interests of the Un Agendas 2020 and 2030. The Ultimate Centralisation , The Rules Based international Order?

Click to access 461290PUB0Box3101OFFICIAL0USE0ONLY1.pdf


Developer Exactions and Impact Fees Developer exactions and impact fees, unlike value capture, approach land financing from the cost side. They are one-time, up-front charges designed to recover the infrastructure costs associated with growth. Although the terms are not distinguished consistently, developer exactions here refer to the requirement that developers either install at their own expense the internal infrastructure required to meet development standards or pay for infrastructure elements provided by public authorities. Impact fees are designed to cover the costs of the external infrastructure caused by new development. Growth generates demand for systemwide expansions in infrastructure capacity for roads, water supply, wastewater removal, parks, and other facilities. Impact fees and developer exactions are designed to make growth “pay its way” by requiring developers to pay for the expansion in infrastructure capacity that growth necessitates.

The initial versions of impact fees were challenged by developers in courts. From the various court cases, basic rules have emerged about the standards that impact fees must meet to withstand legal scrutiny. These include the following: • There must be a “rational nexus” between the impact fee charged to developers and the capital expenditure it finances. That is, the government must demonstrate that investment is required to provide services to a growing population, not merely to upgrade services provided to existing residents.

Developer exactions for internal infrastructure are now standard throughout most developed countries, although often they recover only part of the
infrastructure costs.2 Impact fees covering external infrastructure are limited
primarily to the United States, where they have become an important part of
the overall urban infrastructure financing picture. They first became popular
in the 1970s in response to the tax revolt against rapidly rising local property
taxes. The opposition to property taxes eventually succeeded in capping property tax rates for existing homeowners in many states, forcing authorities to
find other ways to pay for the infrastructure investments required by growth.
Impact fees were first introduced in states with high rates of urban expansion
and voter resistance to property taxes, like Arizona, California, and Florida
(see Bowles and Nelson 2007 for a recent review of the use of impact fees in
the United States and their political and legal background).
The initial versions of impact fees were challenged by developers in
courts. From the various court cases, basic rules have emerged about the
standards that impact fees must meet to withstand legal scrutiny. These
include the following:
• There must be a “rational nexus” between the impact fee charged to developers and the capital expenditure it finances. That is, the government must
demonstrate that investment is required to provide services to a growing
population, not merely to upgrade services provided to existing residents.

• Impact fees must be limited to a “proportionate share” of infrastructure
costs. The costs of infrastructure expansion that benefit both existing and
new residents must be shared between tax and revenue sources so that new
developments are charged, via impact fees, only their proportionate share
of the costs, as measured by usage or benefits.
• All revenues from impact fees must be used exclusively for the capital investment purpose cited to justify the fee. They cannot be used to finance other
parts of the local capital budget or to contribute to the operating budget.
• States must expressly authorize local governments to impose impact fees,
and local governments must follow the procedures specified in the state’s
authorizing legislation. As of late 2006, 26 states had passed authorizing
legislation, including all of the rapidly growing states.
Well-designed impact fee systems now analyze carefully the actual incremental capital costs caused by different types and sizes of development at different locations. Cost calculations are differentiated for each type of
infrastructure. Impact fees are differentiated by residential, commercial, and
industrial use, by house and lot size as proxies for water and wastewater
demand and automobile trips, and by location relative to existing infrastructure systems and their unused capacity. The result is a highly differentiated
matrix of impact fees that helps to steer development to locations where it can
be accommodated most efficiently. Brueckner has demonstrated that financing growth-related infrastructure through impact fees is more economically
efficient, as measured by total urban land value, than financing growth
through a general property tax or other measures that spread costs over both
the existing population and new development (Brueckner 1997, 2001).

Localisation starts with Local representation, the Isle of Dogs Neighbourhood forum is a sockpuppet for 3rd sector crony Capitalism

( Stalinism/Fascism) At best useful Idiots at worse fellow travellers with the Stalinist faction of the Oligarchy.

Vote no on 26th May 2021, Take Back Control and aspire to home ownership not a social points system of Housing allocation under Commissar (Mayor) John Biggs.

Anti Homes Community Plan



Author: rogerglewis

https://about.me/rogerlewis Looking for a Job either in Sweden or UK. Freelance, startups, will turń my hand to anything.

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