What next for the Money Power? Snakes and Adders. #ConquestofDough #CovidPurpose The Carbon Gold Standard.

This is a long post, My initial question to myself was, Who lent the money to George Soros to “Break the Bank of England”, This post resulted and I am digesting the linkages and pondering the questions arising.
Why is Mark Carney being afforded such a prominent position in our Public Discourse? What next for “The Money Power”?

The year 1924 will always be remembered by students of economic history as the year in which
Reginald McKenna “blew the gaff” on the banking system in his now-famous admission to the
shareholders of the Midland Bank, in January, 1924:

I am afraid the ordinary citizen will not like to be told that the banks can, and do create
money. The amount of money in existence varies only with the action of the banks in
increasing and decreasing deposits and bank purchases. Every loan, overdraft or bank
purchase creates a deposit, and every repayment of a loan, overdraft, or bank sale destroys

Lets get the Charges of Anti Semitism out of the way first.
Eric Dudley Butler (7 May 1916 – 7 June 2006) was an Australian political activist and journalist, who in 1946 founded the far-right Australian League of Rights, which he led until 1992. He was known as a staunch anti-communist and virulent anti-Semite. He died in Victoria in 2006, aged 90.
Death and legacy
Douglas died in his home in Fearnan, Scotland. Douglas and his theories are referred to several times (unsympathetically) in Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s trilogy A Scots Quair. He is also mentioned, together with Karl Marx and Silvio Gesell, by John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936, p. 32). Douglas’s theories permeate the poetry and economic writings of Ezra Pound. Robert Heinlein’s first novel For Us, The Living: A Comedy of Customs describes a near future United States operating according to the principles of social credit.

The real fight was between the Money Power and Monarchy, with the victory of the Money Power
in 1688 when James II was driven off the throne by his son-in-law, William III, who was brought to
Britain at the behest of the financial interests. The Bank of England was formed six years later—
1694—and with it began the National Debt. The Bank was formed for the purpose of lending money
to the crown and was modeled on the Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1609, the first bank in
Northern Europe. The part played by Jews in this formation of the modern banking system, together
with the modern Stock Exchange, was considerable

Calvanism is arguably by far the most telling influence on the course of British Political Economy. See Thierry Meyssan.

The desire for a ‘Jewish Homeland’ among the Jewish Diaspora is commonly understood to explain the origins of political Zionism in the mid-late 19th century; but that is only part of the story. This article is a brief introduction to the key role of the inheritors of Oliver Cromwell’s ‘Commonwealth’ in its realisation in the State of Israel by actively seeking to harness the Diaspora to their purposes.

CALVIN SAID Belloc characterised the Reformation as´´a rising of the rich against the poor´´,´and indeed Calvin had written the unfortunate statement:´´The people must always be kept in poverty in order that they remain obedient´´.

Sir John Houblon (13 March 1632 – 10 January 1712) was the first Governor of the Bank of England from 1694 to 1697.
The Houblon family were Huguenots from Lille and he later became an elder in the French Protestant Church of London in Threadneedle Street.[1] He married Mary Jurin in 1660, who came from a Flemish Protestant family and they had five sons and six daughters, but only two sons survived their father. They lived in a magnificent house just off Threadneedle Street on the site later occupied by the Bank of England and he also acquired a country house at High Ongar in Essex.[2] He became Sheriff of the City of London in 1689, an Alderman from 1689 to 1712, and Master of the Grocer’s Company from 1690 to 1691. He was Lord Mayor in 1695.

He was a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty from 1694 to 1699. It was during this time, from 1694 until 1697, that he served as inaugural governor of the Bank of England.[3] He was again a Bank of England director from 1700, and a director of the New East India Company from 1700 to 1701.

He stood as a Parliamentary candidate for the City of London in 1701, but was defeated. Some sources state incorrectly that he was Member of Parliament for Bodmin.[4]

His younger brother, Abraham Houblon, was also Bank of England Governor, from 1703 to 1705. A daughter of Abraham Houblon, Anne, was married to Henry Temple, later Viscount Palmerston, in 1703. His older brother, James, an influential merchant and Member of Parliament for the City of London, was also a director of the Bank of England.[5] Four other of his brothers were prosperous merchants.[6]


William Patterson and the Darien Scheme.

What a Tangled Web We weave When first we practice to deceive

conventional view is that Britain joined both at the wrong time, namely on the verge of an
impending recession, and at the wrong exchange rate, with the pound, by most estimates,
deemed to have been around 10% overvalued. This, so it is argued, required onerously
high levels of interest rates in order to keep sterling within its ERM bandwidths, severely
exacerbated the effects of the recession, and ultimately undermined the credibility of the
government’s commitment to the regime, leading to sterling’s ejection from it on ‘Black
Wednesday’ in September 1992. In sum, for all its noble aims, membership of the ERM is
emblazoned across Britain’s twentieth century experience as one of its most inglorious
policy episodes. As Budd (2005: 15) explains: ‘The commonly held view is that our
membership of the ERM was a disaster and was always doomed to fail’. Or, as Thompson
(1995: 248), puts it, joining the ERM ‘brought no benefits to the UK at all. The story of
policy-making on ERM is thus one of missed opportunities, chronic misperception by
British policy-makers and huge welfare losses for the British economy….unequivocally a
policy disaster’.

The Exchange Rate Mechanism was intended by its designers as a step towards European monetary union.
Now, monetary union was not mentioned as an aim in the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, which provided for the
founding of the European Communities, as the European Union used to be called, but it was agreed by the
original six founding members, which of course excluded Britain, at a summit meeting of heads of government
at The Hague in 1969, four years before we joined, because the six founding members said exchange rate
stability was necessary for the common price system of the Common Agricultural Policy, to encourage trade
between member states, and above all, to give Europe more weight in a world economy dominated by the volatile
American dollar. The Prime Minister of Luxembourg was commissioned to produce a report on the subject, and
he proposed that monetary union should be achieved by 1980. This was agreed by the six at a summit in Paris in
1972, and endorsed by Edward Heath’s pro-European Conservative Government, and a precursor to the ERM
was set up, called the snake, by which members agreed to peg their currencies to each other, but the snake
soon ran into trouble because of the instability of the dollar during the final stages of the Vietnam War and then
the problems caused by the huge rise in oil prices which followed the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East in 1973,
and the snake was abandoned in 1979. Now,

we joined the snake in 1972, but remained in it for just eight weeks,
before speculative pressures against the currency forced exit, and in the process, we lost $2.5 billion of foreign
exchange reserves in six days,
a precursor perhaps of what was to happen with the ERM, and upon leaving the
snake, we reverted to a floating currency.


But if 1974 was, you might say, a year of unreality, 1975 proved a year of fundamental policy changes and there
were no fewer than four absolutely fundamental policy changes which I think serve to divide the post-1974
period in post-War history from the pre-1975 period.
The first fundamental change was an abandonment of the commitment to full employment, so as to give priority
to the conquest of inflation. This change was announced in Healey’s 1975 Budget. He said that although
unemployment was rising, “I do not believe that it would be wise to put unemployment as the central problem.”
He said he could not increase demand anymore because he could no longer finance the balance of payments
deficit by borrowing, so he decided to shift resources from domestic demand to the balance of payments, even
if this meant a further rise in unemployment. That went against traditional Keynesian theory, which, when faced
with rising unemployment, said there should be a fiscal stimulus to the economy. Healey was proposing the
opposite. This fundamental change, it is worth emphasising, came about not under Margaret Thatcher or her
Government from 1979, but under a Labour Government, with Healey as Chancellor, a Government of the left.
Under Labour, unemployment reached a peak of 1.5 million, and it has not fallen below a million since – it has
often been higher. This heralded a move to permanently higher levels of unemployment in the 1980s, which
peaked in 1982 at 13% of the labour force. Since the 1970s, it has averaged 7%. Now, at a time of supposedly
low unemployment, just over 5%, higher than at any time before the mid-1970s, so you can divide this period in
terms of levels of unemployment.
The second major change occurred in Healey’s second Budget of the year, in July, when he imposed cash limits
to policy programmes. Previously, a programme had been agreed, and if inflation had made the made the
programme more expensive, the money had been found, so the programmes had been effectively inflation
proof. This was no longer to be the case, except for Social Security cash payments, where the Government
obviously had to meet whatever was required for the sick, disabled, unemployed and pensioners, but all other
programmes were to be fixed in cash terms, not in real terms.
The third change was a reduction in public spending, and indeed a questioning of the belief, very strong in
Labour circles up to that time, that a growth in public spending was necessarily a good thing – was it really as
beneficial as had previously been thought? Now, according to Tony Benn’s Diaries, in Cabinet in 1975, Denis
Healey was arguing that public expenditure cuts would not necessarily be unpopular. He said: “At the Labour
Clubs, you will find there is an awful lot of support for the policy of cutting public expenditure. They will all tell you
about Paddy Murphy up the street who has got 18 children, has not worked for years, lives on unemployment
benefit, has a colour television, and goes to Majorca for his holidays.” Plus a change… So, there was a move
towards reducing public spending and the size of the State.
The fourth and final major change was the introduction of a voluntary incomes policy in July 1975, and this
incomes policy accepted that in consequence of the oil prices, the standard of living would have to fall, and the
voluntary incomes policy implied a cut in living standards of around 2.5% over the year.
Now, none of this was popular, and in September 1975, Healey was voted off the Labour Party’s National
Executive. Two leading left-wingers in the Party expressed their disappointment in their Diaries. Tony Benn said,
“I despair of the Labour Government as a force for transformation.” Barbara Castle said, “I see no reason for the
existence of a Labour Government.” But despite that, there were to be further cuts in public expenditure in
So, all these fundamental changes, let me again emphasise, came before Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and before
the IMF came in in 1976.

The new policies did have some success, and the summer of 1975 proved a watershed as regards wage
settlements. The TUC persuaded the unions to accept the Government’s guidelines for two years after 1975, and
from then on, the annual rate of inflation fell to around 10%, though some argued it would have fallen anyway.
But despite this, if 1975 was the year of fundamental change, 1976 was the year in which the wheels fell off the
Government’s policies because the improvement in the economy did not prove sufficient to restore confidence in
Sterling, nor in the underlying economic position.
The oil-producing countries were now seeking to place their surplus funds in other financial centres besides
Britain and many wanted to invest in property elsewhere in the world. There was a fear that, although the real
economy was improving, there was a worry that Sterling would depreciate, and the trouble was that when a
currency is felt to be weak and there seemed to be deep underlying economic problems, markets will put the
worst construction on all news, and in particular, it was felt that this new economic policy of retrenchment did
not have full Labour Party support, and that feeling was strengthened in February 1976, when Healey produced
a public expenditure White Paper saying that there should be a further reduction in the share of resources taken
by public expenditure and that resources should then be moved to the balance of payments. There was a vote
on that in the House of Commons in March 1976 and enough Labour rebels abstained on the vital vote so that
the Government was defeated, and the defeat had to be reversed by a vote of confidence the next day.
Healey reacted to this speech with great anger. He had an ebullient rough manner and enjoyed being rude to
people, which was not always appreciated by others. Gerald Barnett, his Chief Secretary of the Treasury, said at
one meeting in the Treasury, Healey ended the meeting by saying, “Let me make sure that I have indeed insulted
everyone around this table.” Healey shouted at the left-wing rebels in the Commons that they were “out of their
tiny little Chinese minds”. The Chinese Embassy complained, and Healey had to make an apology… There was
even worse: Healey and the left began swearing at each other in the House of Commons – it was not then
televised, but in the full hearing of other Members, and Healey always said that they had a very complex love life
in the Labour Party. He said, in his Memoirs, he said feelings were at boiling point on both sides. “As I returned to
the Chamber from the voting lobby, one of the rebels used demotic language to cast aspersions on my
paternity, so I praised his virility in similar language, several times.”
Now, five days after this disaster, Harold Wilson resigned, and he had not told Healey that he would resign,
although he had told James Callaghan, and of course Healey’s chances of the leadership, whatever they were,
were not improved by this episode, and indeed, Callaghan became Prime Minister.
With Callaghan as Prime Minister, there were further reductions in public spending, both in a budget in April and
another budget in July, and,

in June 1976, the Government was forced to borrow to prevent a further
depreciation of Sterling and loss of reserves. It gained

credits of $5.3 billion from the group of 10 industrial
nations for three months

, with provision for renewal for just one three-month term after that, and the
Government could not get borrowing on any other terms.

People did not believe in the progress of the British
economy. This meant the loan would run out on 7th December 1976, and if, at that time, it could not be repaid,
the Government would have to go to the IMF.
The pound continued to fall, and on 28th September 1976, just as Labour’s Annual Conference was beginning,
the pound suffered its largest one-day fall in value since Sterling had been floated in 1972. There had now been
eight budgets since Healey had become Chancellor in March 1974, and the pound had fallen from 2.30 to the
dollar, when Healey had become Chancellor, to 1.67, and since Callaghan had become Prime Minister in April, the
pound had fallen by nearly 20%, larger than the devaluations of 1949 and 1967.
The selling of Sterling was reaching dangerous levels, and Healey was told of this news as he was going to
London Airport for a meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Hong Kong, to be followed by a meeting of
the IMF at Manila, at which Britain’s application for a long-term loan from the IMF would be considered. Now,
Healey decided not to travel to these meetings but to go back to London and then to talk to the Labour Party
Conference which was then in session.

He told them he was applying to the IMF for a loan, and that was very
unusual at that time for a developed country – it was mostly developing countries which applied for loans – and
that the application was for $3.9 billion, at that time the largest sum ever requested at the IMF.

Healey told the
Labour Party Conference, melodramatically, that he had come “from the battlefront”, that he would seek a loan
from the IMF so he could continue with existing policies. He received a mixed reception from the Party
Conference, as you can imagine.



Fighting off the Speculators

“Our total position by Black Wednesday had to be worth almost $10 billion. We planned to sell more than that. In fact, when Norman Lamont [the British finance minister] said just before the devaluation that he would borrow nearly $15 billion to defend sterling, we were amused because that was about how much we wanted to sell.”

  • George Soros, 1992

As Europe slept, Soros borrowed and sold pounds from anyone that he could. The Quantum Fund’s position exceeded $10 billion shorting the pound. Other hedge funds got wind of the trade (and the report from the Bundesbank) and started following suit, also borrowing and selling pounds.

By the time London markets opened for business and British treasury officials started their day, tens of billions of pounds had been sold. The pound was dangerously close to trading below the levels mandated by the ERM.

The Bank of England was about to have a very shitty day.

British officials first responded by buying one billion pounds at 8:40 AM. The purchase had no effect on the price of the pound. The whole world was selling, and the British government didn’t have the buying power to fight it all off. It’s estimated that the British government spent £27 billion of its reserves buying up pounds to no avail.

By 9AM, finance minister Norman Lamont contacted Prime Minister John Major and told him they couldn’t possibly buy up enough pounds to keep the currency propped up. The only option left for the British government to keep their currency trading at the right level would be to increase interest rates dramatically and attract people to buy pounds. Major refused. Britain was in the midst of a recession, and increasing rates would further shrink the economy. It would be political suicide.

Blood was in the water. Global capital continued to bet against the pound. An hour and a half later, Lamont called the Prime Minister to re-plead his case. The Prime Minister relented. At 11AM, the British government announced they would increase interest rates 200 basis points, from 10% to 12%.

How did the value of the pound react to this enormous increase in interest rates? Nothing happened. The pound continued to plummet. Lamont headed to the Prime Minister’s residence to figure out how to salvage the situation, which led them to announce an interest rate increase of another 300 basis points, from 12% to 15%.

What was the effect of this rate increase on the sterling? Again, nothing. As Mallaby later documents in his book, Soros and the gang of speculators knew victory was near:

“At their desks on the other side of the Atlantic, Druckenmiller and Soros saw the rate hikes as an act of desperation by a dying man. They were a signal that the end was nigh–and that it was time for one last push to sell the life out of the British currency.”

The market expected that Britain would have to devalue its currency and that no amount of interest rate hikes or currency purchasing would change that. At this point, the sentiment that Britain would exit the ERM and devalue its currency was a self-fulfilling prophecy; if the speculators believed it enough to put their money behind it, it would eventually come true.

At 7:30 PM that night, Lamont held a news conference to announce that Britain would be exiting the ERM and floating its currency on the market. Soros and the speculators won.

QUESTION, Where and from Whom did Quantum Fund Borrow the 10 Billions stirling from?

QUESTION. 2.5 Billions Lost in 8 weeks membership of “The Snake” in 1972 , who knew this then, least of all who knew now?


The 1976 IMF Crisis was a balance of payments or currency crisis in the United Kingdom in 1976 which forced James Callaghan’s Labour Party government to borrow $3.9 billion ($17.5 billion in 2019)[1] from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),[2] at the time the largest loan ever to have been requested from the IMF.[3]
The IMF Crisis took place during James Callaghan’s term as Prime Minister,[4] and caused the Bank of England to withdraw temporarily from the foreign exchange market.[5] After the defeat of the public expenditure white paper in the House of Commons in March 1976 and the resignation of Harold Wilson, many investors became convinced the pound would soon lose value due to inflation. By June 1976, the pound had reached a record low against the dollar.[3]

Only half of the loan was actually drawn by the UK government and it was repaid by 4 May 1979.[6] Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, went on to state that the main reason the loan had to be requested was that public sector borrowing requirement figures provided by the treasury were grossly overstated.[7] Despite this all terms required by the IMF were fully implemented.

The IMF loan meant that the United Kingdom’s economy could be stabilised whilst drastic budget cuts were implemented. Even with the loan’s security, the Labour Party had already begun unravelling into camps of social democrats and left-wing supporters, which caused bitter rows inside the party and with the unions. Many believe this may have contributed significantly to Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 Conservative victory.[8]

Whig Junto
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Three members of the Junto: from left to right, Lords:
Somers, Montagu/Halifax and Orford
The Whig Junto is the name given to a group of leading Whigs who were seen to direct the management of the Whig Party and often the government, during the reigns of William III and Anne.[1] It was the inspiration for Benjamin Franklin’s Junto in 1727 Philadelphia upon his return from London.[2] The Whig Junto proper consisted of John Somers, later Baron Somers; Charles Montagu, later Earl of Halifax; Thomas Wharton, later Marquess of Wharton, and Edward Russell, later Earl of Orford.[3] They came to prominence due to the favour of Robert Spencer, 2nd Earl of Sunderland[4] and during the reign of Queen Anne, Sunderland’s son, the 3rd Earl succeeded his father. Opponents gave them the nickname “the five tyrannising lords”. Other figures prominent around the edges of the Junto include Sir John Trenchard and Thomas Tollemache.

Somers, Wharton, Russell and Montagu were elected to the House of Commons in 1689[5] and were granted minor office. Their effectiveness in the Commons brought them Sunderland’s attention. The Junto began to dominate the ministry from the time of the resignation of the Tory Secretary of State Lord Nottingham in 1693,[6] communicating to the King and Sunderland through the Whig Secretary of State, the Duke of Shrewsbury. As the members of the Junto entered the Lords — Somers was made Lord Keeper in 1693[7] and was promoted to a barony four years later,[8] Wharton succeeded his father as Baron Wharton in 1696,[9] Russell was created Earl of Orford in 1697[10] and Montagu(e)[n 1] was created Baron Halifax in 1700 — their hold on the Commons weakened and by 1700 the Junto was largely out of power.[11] In 1701 Somers, Orford and Halifax were impeached but survived the attack[12] and late in the year the Junto seemed set to return to power in order to help the king rally support for the War of the Spanish Succession. However, King William’s death in March 1702 delayed their return: Queen Anne detested them and refused to include them in the ministry, which was instead dominated by High Tories, with whom her sympathies lay.[13] With the elder Sunderland dead, the Junto’s connection to his son — who was the son-in-law of the Queen’s favourite couple, the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough — proved useful, as did the Junto’s support of the war, which contrasted with Tory ambivalence to it.

In 1705 Somers’s protégé Lord Cowper was made Lord Keeper[14] and in 1706 Sunderland became a Secretary of State.[15] After the resignation of Harley in 1708, Marlborough and his ally the Lord Treasurer Godolphin became more and more dependent on the Junto, who returned to office with Somers as Lord President, Wharton as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and Orford as First Lord of the Admiralty.[16]

The ministry’s increasing dependence on the Junto Whigs caused the Queen’s relationship with the Marlboroughs and Godolphin to sour. In 1710 Godolphin and the Junto Whigs were forced from power.[17] The Junto led opposition to the new ministry’s peace policy from the House of Lords, leading to the creation of new peers to prevent this opposition from voting down the peace treaty.[18]

The term “Junto” is derived from “Junta”, a Hispano-Portuguese term for a civil deliberative or administrative council, which in 18th-century English had not yet gained its present association with the governments of a military dictatorship.


The First Whig Junto controlled the government of England from 1694 to 1699 and was the first part of the Whig Junto, a cabal of people who controlled the most important political decisions.[n 1] The Junto was reappointed twice following the elections of 1695 and 1698.
The Whig elite rose to government ascendancy while Lord Danby held office through three shortly-spaced changes of Sovereign (dating to the Royal-dominated ministries of Charles II). The Junto established its dominance in 1694 with the appointment of Sir Charles Montagu as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 10 May.[1] Danby, who had been created Duke of Leeds on 4 May, remained in office, under a diminished role while still Lord President of the Council, but the Junto controlled the government of England from 1694 to 1699.

It was led by six prominent members: Montagu[n 2], Somers, Wharton, Romney, Orford, and Shrewsbury. Supporting these peers were two unofficial whips in the House of Lords: the Earls of Sunderland and Portland. Only one of these held at the time an office, albeit less senior, as Lord Chamberlain. The Whig Party held a majority in the House of Commons after the election in 1695, although not all Whig MPs were unswervingly loyal to the Junto.

The Junto oversaw the creation of the Bank of England in 1694, but by 1699 the Junto’s power had declined in the face of opposition by Robert Harley and the Tories.[1] Many members of the Junto would return to government from 1706 to 1710 as part of the Godolphin-Marlborough ministry.

The modern banking system did not exist in Britain until Cromwell’s regime. In his history of
England, Macaulay says that banking had not started at the time of the Restoration (1660).
Merchants had their strong-boxes and paid out honest coin on demand. A. E. Feaveryear, in The
Pound Sterling (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1931) fixes the origin of English banking as 1662.
Goldsmiths started to give receipts for money held. These were passed about, and thus the cheque
and banknote were born. The goldsmiths began to find that they could make more loans than they
had cash. Macaulay quotes a pamphlet, published in 1695, as saying: “Indeed, no goldsmith had in
his vaults guineas and crowns to the full value of his paper”. In other words, the goldsmiths were
swindling their customers by lending, or pretending to lend, what they did not possess.
William was finding that his war against France was not very popular. Money was hard to obtain. It
was at that stage that William Paterson, a Scottish economist and financier, hit upon the brilliant
idea of forming a Bank, to be called the Bank of England, for the purpose of lending the King
money. Whatever the present supporters of the banking swindle may say, the man who was
primarily responsible for the Bank of England frankly admitted what he was doing. In a plan for
forming the bank which he drew up at that time, he said: “The Bank hath benefit of interest on all
moneys which it creates out of nothing.”
This Scot knew the real basis of banking, and, unlike his successors, did not bother to conceal it. The
merchants of London were very keen on the idea, although the Government of the day was not very
enthusiastic. In his History of His Own Times (1693), Bishop Burnet wrote:
The fear of centralisation of the money power was indeed the grounds upon which the
Tories and Commons fought so bitterly against the founding of the Bank of England,
thinking that the bank would grow to be a monopoly. All the money in England would
come into their hands, and they would, in a few years, become the masters of the stock and
wealth of the nation.
Needless to say, the majority of the Whigs favoured the establishment of the Bank. The first
Governor was Sir John Doublon, a Dutchman. The formation of the Bank in 1694 was incredibly
camouflaged in its authorisation by “The Tonnage Act.” As far as I am aware, there had been no
attempt to have the Charter of the Bank revoked until August 13, 1940, when Mr. Stokes, Labour
Member for Ipswich, asked the Prime Minister whether there would be time made available to
discuss a motion to that end standing in his name. Mr. Attlee, replied, and said that no time for
discussion was possible. Which indicates quite clearly that there is very little hope of financial
reform from the British Labour Party. Mr. Stokes’s resolution read as follows:
That this House calls upon His Majesty’s Government to revoke the Charter of the Bank of
England, whereby the right to issue money was passed to private interest in the reign of William
and Mary, and to repeal all Acts of Parliament passed in support thereof since its granting, so as
to take back for the benefit of the people the power which rightly belongs to them. . . .

Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s published diaries Table Talk. Table Talk.
this from 27th April 1823.

The national debt has, in fact, made more men rich than have a right to be so, or, rather, any ultimate power, in case of a struggle, of actualizing their riches. It is, in effect, like an ordinary, where three hundred tickets have been distributed, but where there is, in truth, room only for one hundred. So long as you can amuse the company with any thing else, or make them come in successively, all is well, and the whole three hundred fancy themselves sure of a dinner; but if any suspicion of a hoax should arise, and they were all to rush into the room at once, there would be two hundred without a potato for their money; and the table would be occupied by the landholders, who live on the spot.


NOTES and references.
In producing a post such as this one is really thinking out loud, often such an excercise produces more questions, sometimes better questions.
Previous questions which have informed my own direction of inquiry are these two.

To whom do we owe this money exactly?

refs. Basically whats open in my Browser following hitting publish.

The Covid-19 pandemic is being used as a pretext for the most extreme power grab in history, but by over extending themselves the ruling elite are setting themselves up to lose everything


The 1925 Return to Gold: Keynes and Mr
Churchill’s Economic Crisis
James Ashley Morrison
Middlebury College
APSA 2009
A Monetary Revolution: John Locke and the Creation of England’s Fixed Exchange Rate Regime J. A. Morrison Middlebury College October 2008

The Heyday of the Gold Standard, 1820-1930
1925 July
“The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill”: John
Maynard Keynes published a broad-ranging attack on Britain’s
return to the gold standard in 1925 in which he argued that
Britain had returned to the gold standard at too high a parity.
He suggested that committing to the pre-war parity would
ultimately prove deflationary with deleterious consequences
for employment and growth. In this excerpt, Keynes rejects
the financial community’s unanimity in favor of a return to
the gold standard, a consensus of opinion that is illustrated in
several of the immediately previous documents. Keynes’
analysis proved prescient.

#FUD EDITION #GrubStreetJournal
The Trade of the Century: When George Soros Broke the British Pound
Mr Churchills excercise , The Treasury Minute and responses 1925


Hope without an object cannot live. This Land is Mine, Henry George and the Single Land Tax

BILDERBERG, THE MOVIE Written & Produced by Daniel Estulin, Directed by Joan Cutrina
“Murio la Verdad”
Infiltrating Bilderberg 2005
By DANIEL ESTULIN May 27, 2005
Coal and Oil: The Dark Monarchs of Global Energy – Understanding Supply and Extraction Patterns and their Importance for Future Production
Four days to declare a Cold War
by Thierry Meyssan
The week that has just ended was exceptionally rich in events. But no media were able to report it, because they had all deliberately masked certain of their number in order to protect the story that was being woven by their government. London had attempted to provoke a major conflict, but lost to Russia, President Trump and Syria.


The Bank War was a political struggle that developed over the issue of rechartering the Second Bank of the United States (B.U.S.) during the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–1837). The affair resulted in the shutdown of the Bank and its replacement by state banks.
Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s Frank C. Costigliola

Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital Piero Sraffa