FOR THE STUDY OF PEAK OIL AND GAS
NEWSLETTER No. 100 – APRIL 2009
To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;To love, and bear; to hope till Hope createsFrom its own wreck the thing it contemplates;Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;This, like thy glory, Titan, is to beGood, great and joyous, beautiful and free;This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.
When it comes to exploration, a good prospect is a good prospect irrespective of the price. This is illustrated by the three deepwater giant oil
fields Thunder Horse (US Gulf of Mexico), Rosa (Angola) and Hungo-part of
Kizomba A (Angola), which were discovered in 1998 when oil prices were at
a low point. A less promising and/or more difficult prospect can be more interesting during times of high prices. This is because the high risk involved
with drilling the prospect is balanced by the higher reward if it is a discovery. A basin with no petroleum system or a region with too thin layers of
sediments will never turn into a good prospect even if the price increases
tenfold, see for example Sweden2.
Production wise, a large field will be developed even in times of low prices
since they in general have a high production rate (see Kizomba A example
The conclusion is that the potential revenues generated by an oil field decide if a field will be developed or not. A large oil field will generate enough
revenue to motivate a development even in times of very low oil prices.
2It can be argued that Sweden has large volumes of oil shale and therefore can be an oil
producer. However, oil shales are not yet mature source rocks and oil production in a conventional way will not take place. But if progress in shale oil production nears commercialization, Sweden might be an shale oil producer in the future again. If patient, the oil shale
might mature into source rocks some million years down the line and generate petroleum.
This article has explored the interaction between oil prices and high debt levels of
oil companies. There is some evidence that higher leverage has affected the
response of oil producers to lower prices and, eventually, oil price dynamics. Oil
sector leverage also complicates the assessment of the macroeconomic implications
of lower oil prices.
Many of the findings are tentative, and quantifying the financial and
macroeconomic significance of the mechanisms discussed remains a topic for future
research. That said, the discussion highlights two issues that are of relevance
beyond the energy sector.
First, the oil–debt nexus illustrates the evolving risks in the financial system.
Rapidly rising leverage creates risk exposures in the non-financial corporate sector
that may be transferred across the global financial system. Similarly, rising leverage
puts a greater premium on the liquidity of the markets for the assets that back debt.
Both developments underscore the need to better understand the functioning,
behaviour and interaction of markets and intermediaries.
Second, the build-up of debt in the oil sector provides an example of how high
debt levels can induce new linkages between individual markets and the wider
economy. Such interaction needs to be taken into account in assessments of the
economic implications of falling oil prices.
Tim Garrett, Steve Keen, and Grasselii Article
When I posted the link to the Preprint earlier, I thought people would read it if they are interested. But you do have to click through to the full article. So here is the link to the full article:
Click to access esd-2021-21.pdf
One conceptual highlight: “energy is required not just to sustain that which we believe available to be sold, but also the unspoken utility of that which has previously been produced. Civilization was not built in a day.” This is reminiscent of the Howard Odum argument that a college professor with chalk and a blackboard is a highly energy intensive occupation.
John Adamson January 9, 2022 at 6:44 pm said:
That all seems to make sense.
Our civilization was built on a ECoE of less than 1%. To maintain the level of complexity, then the ECoE must stay at <1%.
I’m interested in the role of money in a de-growth situation.
As far as I can tell (please tell me otherwise, if I have it wrong) there are two ways money is created.
- Central Banks creating reserves. (I’m of the MMT persuasion, and think that Governments spend first and tax later, not the other way round. The rate of taxation never reaches the amount that the Central Bank has created, so money is left in the economy. Inflation is kept at bay by a growing economy that can absorb the untaxed (un-destroyed) money
- Banks create money on license by creating deposits in customer accounts as loans/debt. The interest on the loans being paid by an increase in economic activity. Growth.
Both systems require for there to be growth in the economy for it all to work.
In a de-growth situation, the whole banking system will collapse. This will not be a gradual process. It just can’t function without growth.
How will money function in a de-growth world?
a factor of 7.9. The ratio y = Y /E, sometimes termed the energy productivity, has trended steadily upward. Defining growth
rates in quantity X as RX = (1/X)dX/dt = dlnX/dt, a least-squares fit to the data gives Ry = 1.00% per year. Meanwhile,
the ratio k = K/E grew at rate Rk = 1.96% per year, nearly twice as fast as y, or a doubling time of 35 years. The economy
appears to be becoming rapidly less energy intensive, suggesting that technological innovation is enabling more to be done
with less (Sorrell, 2014).
Energy Returned on Energy Invested, Surplus Energy Economics DataBase ( SEEDS) Embodied Energy Circular Economy. #GrubStreetJournal #GrubStreetScience #GrubStreetEnergy #TheExergist #TheExergyst Exorcising the stupid from the discourse on Political Economy, Energy and Climate Change Fanaticism.
Energy Economics, Energy, Statistical Turn in Physics, Atomism, Reductionism, Club of Rome. Claes Johnson, Steinmetz, IronSide, Maxwell. Electronic Universe, Alfven, Hoyle, Wolfram Computation, Applied Maths. Idiotic Climate Change Communicators and their Magical Moronic Shaupenhauerian Evasions. Dr Faustus of Modern Physics. #InfoWars #GoldenGlobes #RickyJervais All wars are bankers wars!#TwoFingers2Brino #4Pamphleteers @GrubStreetJorno @wiki_ballot @financialeyes #IABATO #SAM #GE2019 Roger Lewis ( Porthos) @JoeBlob20
An Exchange with the Climate Church of Armageddon continues. A Letter to Greta from Freinds of Science, Cool it and so comes the Wrong Think Police. #CLimateFraud #ClimateCult #Greta #ExtinctionDistinction
Embodied energy cost of opportunity cost. Which would be a true metric of decision making where resource constraints involve mutually exclusive resource investment decisions. #GrubStreetJournal #HenryGeorge #EnergyEconomics #SingleLandTax #Proudhon
Money flows faster. Financial bubbles inflate.
Economists assure us we grow richer.
Electronic gadgets and entertainments distract us.
Real-world families and communities disintegrate.
Earth and democracy die.
Ruled by soulless corporations
that value money more than life,
we get more money, less life.
We face an epic choice:
People power or corporate power;
living communities or corporate colonies;
democracy or corporatocracy;
more life for all or more money for the few.
Humanity awakens to long-forgotten truths.
We are living beings born of and nurtured by a living Earth.
Real wealth is living wealth.
Money is just a number.
We find true happiness in the joy of living and contributing
as members of caring families and communities.
We have the right and the means
to replace a life-destroying suicide economy
ruled by money-seeking corporate robots
with living economies
grounded in the foundational principles
of democracy, real-market economies, and living systems.
Many millions of people are engaging.
They reconnect with one another and the rest of nature.
They rebuild living communities, democracy, and economies
in which people cooperate to make a living
rather than compete to make a killing.
Finally , Take the CLot Shot, its got Electrolytes you know.
Plateau Oil and the Energy Transition.
Announced Pledges Case
The IEA Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)
are generally phased out over the next 10‐15 years. China’s coal consumption for electricity
declines by 85% between 2020 and 2050 on its path towards carbon neutrality in 2060. These
declines more than offset continued growth for coal in countries without net zero pledges.
Globally, coal use in industry falls by 25% between 2020 and 2050, compared with a 5%
decline in the STEPS.
Oil demand recovers slightly in the early 2020s but never again reaches its historic peak in
2019. It declines to 90 mb/d in the early 2030s and to 80 mb/d in 2050, around 25 mb/d
lower than in the STEPS, thanks to a strong push to electrify transport and shifts to biofuels
and hydrogen, especially in regions with pledges. Natural gas demand increases from about
3 900 bcm in 2020 to around 4 350 bcm in 2025, but is then broadly flat to 2050 (it continues
to grow to around 5 700 bcm in the STEPS).
The fuel mix in final energy use shifts substantially in the APC. By 2050, electricity is the
largest single fuel used in all sectors except transport, where oil remains dominant. The
persistence of oil in transport stems partly from the extent of its continued use in countries
without net zero pledges, and partly from the difficulty of electrifying substantial parts of the
transport sector, notably trucking and aviation. Electricity does make inroads into transport,
however, and rapid growth in the uptake of EVs puts oil use into decline after 2030, with EVs
accounting for around 35% of global passenger car sales by 2030 and nearly 50% in 2050 in
the APC (versus around 25% in the STEPS in 2050). Electrification in the buildings sector is
also much faster in the APC than in the STEPS.
The direct use of renewables expands in all end‐use sectors globally through to 2050. Modern
bioenergy accounts for the bulk of this growth, predominantly through the blending of
biomethane into natural gas networks and liquid biofuels in transport. This occurs mainly in
regions with net zero pledges. Hydrogen and hydrogen‐based fuels play a larger role in the
APC than in the STEPS, reaching almost 15 exajoules (EJ) in 2050, though they still account
for only 3% of total final consumption worldwide in 2050. Transport accounts for more than
two‐thirds of all hydrogen consumption in 2050. In parallel, on‐site hydrogen production in
the industry and refining sectors gradually shifts towards low‐carbon technologies.
1.4.4 Electricity generation
Global electricity generation nearly doubles during the next three decades in the APC, rising
from about 26 800 terawatt‐hours (TWh) in 2020 to over 50 000 TWh in 2050, some
4 000 TWh higher than in the STEPS. Low‐emissions energy sources provide all the increase.
The share of renewables in electricity generation rises from 29% in 2020 to nearly 70% in
2050, compared with about 55% in the STEPS, as solar PV and wind race ahead of all other
sources of generation (Figure 1.14). By 2050, solar PV and wind together account for almost
half of electricity supply. Hydropower also continues to expand, emerging as the third‐largest
energy source in the electricity mix by 2050. Nuclear power increases steadily too,
maintaining its global market share of about 10%, led by increases in China. Natural gas use
in electricity increases slightly to the mid‐2020s before starting to fall back, while coal’s share
of electricity generation falls from around 35% in 2020 to below 10% in 2050. At that point,
20% of the remaining coal‐fired output comes from plants equipped with CCUS.
Hydrogen and ammonia start to emerge as fuel inputs to electricity generation by around
2030, used largely in combination with natural gas in gas turbines and with coal in coal‐fired
power plants. This extends the life of existing assets, contributes to electricity system
adequacy and reduces the overall costs of transforming the electricity sectors in many
countries. Total battery capacity also rises substantially, reaching 1 600 gigawatts (GW) in
2050, 70% more than in the STEPS.
Primary energy production
This is the worldwide production of energy, extracted or captured directly from natural sources. In energy statistics primary energy (PE) refers to the first stage where energy enters the supply chain before any further conversion or transformation process.
Energy production is usually classified as:
fossil, using coal, crude oil, and natural gas;
nuclear, using uranium;
renewable, using biomass, geothermal, hydropower, solar, tidal, wave, wind, and among others.
Primary energy assessment follows certain rules[note 1] to ease measurement of different kinds of energy. These rules are controversial. Water and air flow energy that drives hydro and wind turbines, and sunlight that powers solar panels, are not taken as PE, which is set at the electric energy produced. But fossil and nuclear energy are set at the reaction heat which is about 3 times the electric energy. This measurement difference can lead to underestimating the economic contribution of renewable energy.
The table lists the worldwide PE and the countries/regions producing most (90%) of that. The amounts are rounded and given in million tonnes of oil equivalent per year (1 Mtoe = 11.63 TWh, 1 TWh = 109 kWh). The data are of 2018.
Energy conversion and trade
Primary energy is converted in many ways to energy carriers, also known as secondary energy.
Coal mainly goes to thermal power stations. Coke is derived by destructive distillation of bituminous coal.
Crude oil goes mainly to oil refineries
Natural-gas goes to natural-gas processing plants to remove contaminants such as water, carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide, and to adjust the heating value. It is used as fuel gas, also in thermal power stations.
Nuclear reaction heat is used in thermal power stations.
Biomass is used directly or converted to biofuel.
Electricity generators are driven by
steam or gas turbines in a thermal plant,
or water turbines in a hydropower station,
or wind turbines, usually in a wind farm.
The invention of the solar cell in 1954 started electricity generation by solar panels, connected to a power inverter. Around 2000 mass production of panels made this economic.
Much primary and converted energy is traded among countries, about 5800 Mtoe worldwide, mostly oil and gas. The table lists countries/regions with large difference of export and import. A negative value indicates that much energy import is needed for the economy. The quantities are expressed in Mtoe/a and the data are of 2018. Big transport goes by tanker ship, tank truck, LNG carrier, rail freight transport, pipeline and by electric power transmission.
Total Energy Supply (TES) indicates the sum of production and imports subtracting exports and storage changes. For the whole world TES nearly equals primary energy PE because imports and exports cancel out, but for countries/regions TES and PE differ in quantity, and also in quality as secondary energy is involved, e.g., import of an oil refinery product. TES is all energy required to supply energy for end users. The table lists TES and PE for some countries/regions where these differ much, and worldwide. The amounts are rounded and given in Mtoe. The data are of 2018.
Energy for energy
Main article: Energy return on investment
Some fuel and electricity is used to construct, maintain and demolish/recycle installations that produce fuel and electricity, such as oil platforms, uranium isotope separators and wind turbines. For these producers to be economic the ratio of energy returned on energy invested (EROEI) or energy return on investment (EROI) should be large enough.
If the final energy delivered for consumption is E and the EROI equals R, then the net energy available is E-E/R. The percentage available energy is 100-100/R. For R>10 more than 90% is available but for R=2 only 50% and for R=1 none. This steep decline is known as the net energy cliff.
The most likely outcome will include an unpredictable mixture of components from the entire spectrum of possibilities. We do not know what lies ahead; even the best probabilistic assessments of specific outcomes are, despite their hedged nature, just matters of educated guesses. The notion that in 2020 we can anticipate the world of 2100 is utterly risible. Just look back to the world of 1940 and see what did not exist, and what was not anticipated, in that world. There were no antibiotics, no contraceptives, no nations with below-replacement fertility, no nationwide life expectancies above 60, and no countries where most adults were overweight or obese. When we move our focus from populations to agriculture and food, there were no herbicides, no high-yielding short-stalked cereals, no transgenic crops, no no-till cropping, no central animal feeding operations, no mass-scale greenhouses growing vegetables, no cultivation under plastic sheets, and (bananas aside) no intercontinental trade in fresh fruit.
When we turn to energy, there were no giant open-cast mines, no Saudi oilfields, no offshore drilling (out of the sight of land or in deep waters), no hydraulic fracturing, no liquefied natural gas, no giant oil or LNG tankers, no gigawatt-sized turbogenerators, no widely deployed gas turbines, no flue gas desulfurization, no nuclear reactors, no high-voltage direct-current lines, no PV cells, no wind turbines. Economies had to do without any computers, satellites, jetliners, container shipping, and rapid trains; there was no steel produced in basic oxygen furnaces, no plate-glass made by floating on molten metal, no centrifugal compressors in ammonia synthesis, no composite materials, no solid-state electronic devices and hence no Internet, no mobile phones, no essentially instant and free flow of information. And there were no concerns about acid rain, ozone layer or greenhouse gases; there was no photochemical smog, no antibiotic resistance, no pesticide residues, no mass-scale plastic waste.
Contrary to many modeling dreams, the future remains unknowable, but we know that many options remain available, that choices of possible trajectories and effective alternatives have not been irrevocably foreclosed by our past actions. Grand transitions of population and economic growth, of energy use, and of environmental impacts have brought us to this point in human evolution when both promises and perils have reached their respective extremes exemplified by the claims of approaching singularity and equidistant apocalypse: both are “scheduled” by their proponents to take place before 2050, perhaps even by 2030. I do not believe that in such a short time we will face either an apocalyptic outcome or a care-free singularitarian future of boundless intelligence.
The chances are that we will continue to deal with the coming transition to a civilization operating within the biospheric limits with a combination of aggressive inventiveness and inexplicable procrastination, of effective adaptability and infuriating failure to respond. Will we succeed? The answer hinges on the definition of success, but once all the gains and losses have been factored in, it would be surprising if transitions likely to be accomplished during the 21st century were less transformative than those experienced during the 20th century. Another epochal transition is unfolding and its outcome is not foreordained; it remains contingent on our choices. In that sense, at least, nihil novi sub sole . . .
What makes the modern world work? The answer to this deceptively simple question lies in four “grand transitions” of civilization – in populations, agriculture, energy, and economics – which have transformed the way we live. Societies that have undergone all four transitions emerge into an era of radically different population dynamics, food surpluses (and waste), abundant energy use, and expanding economic opportunities. Simultaneously, in other parts of the world, hundreds of millions remain largely untouched by these developments. Through erudite storytelling, Vaclav Smil investigates the fascinating and complex interactions of these transitions. He argues that the moral imperative to share modernity’s benefits has become more acute with increasing economic inequality, but addressing this imbalance would make it exceedingly difficult to implement the changes necessary for the long-term preservation of the environment. Thus, managing the fifth transition – environmental changes from natural-resource depletion, biodiversity loss, and global warming(? ed) – will determine the success or eventual failure of the grand transitions that have made the world we live in today.
Replying to @GretaThunberg #WithoutHotAir, every Big Helps.#COP26 https://withouthotair.com #DumberandDouma #ConquestofDough #ExtinctionDistinction @JoeBlob20 #IABATO @financialeyes @elleprovocateur @Lloyd__Evans
If Energy production from Hydro Carbons has Peaked and is also potentially going to decline going forward then production of other Energy will be required if prosperity is to be within reach of the whole of the human population.
This is a Distribution problem and one which the existing debt-based money system is failing to address, even assuming it would be capable of addressing the challenges.
The monetary system and Governance systems are not a product of natural biophysical laws, Political Economy and Democratic processes are the correct fora in which the alternatives should be addressed.
The Sortition process and psychological nudge manipulations being shoehorned into place along with a far-fetched mendacious narrative do not guarantee an optimal outcome. Regulatory Capture and a general dumbing down induced by Group think and obedience to “The Science”
The problems in Political Economy as it stands presently and the question of future Political Economy based upon future Energy realities are I think helpfully separated which is something Prof. David MacKay is very successful with, in his presentation of the question.
The Problems are only weakly related with respect to future solutions and breaking the process into 3 parts is useful rather than lumping them all together. It is clear that the existing Form of Market economy and political economy is not able to solve the problem at stage 3 ( I.E Post 2050 post-Oil Economy)
Stage 1 requires a reform of the existing paradigm which involves facing up to the broken debt-based money system. Pension provision, the sovereign debt crisis and Public debt crisis are all addressable and will see improvements even within the deteriorating Cost of energy inputs as a share of output. We could call this stage lets fix what we know is not working.
Stage 2 covers the Post Financialised ( Big Bang Experiment) period to the oil running out in 2050.
This requires a much more long-term investment horizon and complicating the energy mix by overstating the ”Climate Change question** seems to be counterproductive, again I like the way Prof David Mackay dealt with the question including stating the necessities of **Clean Coal and Nuclear”. In this stage, we will be implementing ideas previously barred due to the denial inherent in clinging to a failing system.
Stage 3 Post 2050, This part is much easier than Stage 2 and stage 1, in my opinion, the myth-busting and leveling out inherent in solving the political problems at stage 1 and the challenge to vested interests in stage 2 are by far and away the largest obstacles to getting down to Brass tacks in my opinion.
How ICNIRP, AGNIR, PHE and a 30 year old political decision created and then covered up a global public health scandal