emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs)
high-income advanced economies (AEs).
the relation more pronounced for child mortality. Child
mortality rates visibly increase in the wake of contractions in global income
Cyclical fluctuations in output and mortality rates are negatively correlated over time, consistent with
the notion that mortality increases during economic downturns. This pattern is illustrated in the first and
second panels of Graph 2, which show the evolution of detrended per capita GDP (blue lines) and
detrended mortality and child mortality rates (red lines, inverted scales) over time. Detrended per capita
GDP and death rates move in tandem, with the relation more pronounced for child mortality. Child
mortality rates visibly increase in the wake of contractions in global income, for example following the
Asian crisis in the mid-1990s or in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis.
While average mortality rates are only slightly
higher during recession years in AEs, they increase markedly during recessions in EMDEs (Graph 2, third
panel). In EMDEs, there are on average nine deaths per 1,000 people in years of positive GDP growth.
During recessions the average mortality rate exceeds 12 – an increase by one third.
. In AEs, child mortality rates exhibit
almost no difference in recession and non-recession years (fourth panel). By contrast, in EMDEs they are significantly higher when the economy contracts: child mortality rates average 110 per 1,000 live births in
recessions, compared with around 78 during non-recession years. This implies a relative increase of over
40%, which is notably larger than that for total mortality.4
a 1/4 Child less than the replacement rate of 2.1 live births per million would reduce world population to 2.3 billion in 300 years time ( 30-Nov-200400:28:08Tony Jenkins interviews Joseph Chamie, Director of the United Nations Population Division, for World Chronicle program 960.
11.31 mins Is there an optimal size of population? Chamie says there is no Optimum, its a function of Technology, Social organisation and distribution.
Mortality rates increase for four years on average after the beginning of a recession, while child
mortality rates remain elevated for up to six years. The strong rise in mortality rates during the early years
of recessions reflects that recessions often last more than one year. The years following the start of a
recession are hence occasionally recession years themselves. In AEs (blue lines), mortality and child
mortality rates do not increase in the years following recessions. Mortality rates even slightly decrease
Using panel data covering 180 countries over six decades, this paper shows
that recessions are systematically associated with higher mortality rates.
During years when GDP falls, death rates rise, primarily in emerging market and developing economies and there among children in particular. In
advanced economies, death rates increase only slightly. We further find that
the scarring effects of recessions persist for several years and that deeper recessions lead to larger increases in mortality. In contrast, booms or periods
of subdued growth are not associated with a marked decline in death rates.
Our findings have implications for the policy response to Covid-19 and suggest that the eventual death toll of the pandemic may be understated if the
impact of the coronavirus recession is neglected.
In this paper we investigate an alternative explanation: could there be a link
between recessions and mortality that differs among rich and poor economies?
For a sample of 180 countries over the period from 1961 to 2018 we analyse how
recessions affect overall death rates and child mortality rates. We also investigate
how the effects differ across countries depending on income levels and to which
extend they vary with the depth of the recession.
The data suggest stark differences in the link between recessions, defined as
years of negative GDP growth, and mortality across countries. Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows average death rates during non-recession and recession years in (rich)
advanced economies and (poorer) emerging market and developing economies.
While average mortality rates are not statistically different during recessions in
AEs, they are significantly higher in EMDEs.
Finally, we also contrast the mortality impact of recessions with that of other
phases of the business cycle. Specifically, we consider episodes of economic booms
(above-trend growth) and of slow growth (below-trend but positive growth). The
findings of these exercises suggest an asymmetric effect: while recessions significantly increase mortality, booms and periods of slow growth do not have any
statistically significant effect on death rates.
Using firm-level data on listed non-financial companies in 14 advanced
economies, we document a rise in the share of zombie firms, defined as
unprofitable firms with low stock market valuation, from 4% in the late
1980s to 15% in 2017. These zombie firms are smaller, less productive,
more leveraged, invest less in physical and intangible capital and shrink
their assets, debt and employment. Their performance deteriorates
several years before zombification and remains significantly poorer
than that of non-zombie firms in subsequent years. Over time, some
25% of zombie companies exited the market, while 60% exited from
zombie status. However, recovered zombies underperform compared to
firms that have never been zombies and they face a high probability of
relapsing into zombie status.
Using firm-level data covering 14 advanced economies and spanning three
decades, we identify zombie companies based on (i) their persistent lack of
profitability, i.e. profits insufficient to cover interest payments on debt (interest
coverage ratio below one); and (ii) poor expected future growth potential revealed
through low equity valuations, i.e. a low ratio of the market value of firm assets to
their book value relative to their peers (relatively low Tobin’s q). The data for the
analysis are from the Worldscope database, providing annual financial statements
of listed companies going back to the 1980s.
Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic. #Covidstroika ITS A DIGITAL BANK PASSPORT NOT A VACCINE PASSPORT #QED. @NAOMIRWOLF @financialeyes @JoeBlob20 @Pathos14658352 @DavidGolemXIV
DAVID ROCKEFELLER SPEAKS ABOUT POPULATION CONTROL. 1994
DAVID ROCKEFELLER SPEAKS ABOUT POPULATION CONTROL. 1994
“The People is a beast of muddy brain that knows not its own force, and therefore stands loaded with wood and stone. The powerless hands of a mere child guide it with bit and rein. One kick would be enough to break the chain, but the beast fears, and what the child demands it does. Nor its own terror understands, confused and stupefied by bugbears vain. Most Wonderful! With its own hand it ties and gags itself, gives itself death and war for pence doled out by kings from its own store. Its own are ALL THINGS between earth and heaven. But this it knows not. And if one arise to tell this truth, it kills him unforgiven.”
― Tomasso Campanella
In reality, modern States are specially constituted in order to establish privileges in favour of the rich, at the expense of the poor. The great financial houses of each nation always lay down the law in all political matters of importance. “What will Baron Rothschild say to it?” “What attitude will the syndicate of great bankers in Paris, Vienna, and London take?” Such questions have become the dominant element in political affairs and in the relations between nations. It is the approval or disapproval of financiers that makes and unmakes Ministries everywhere in Europe. True, that in England there is also the approval of the State Church and of the brewers to be faced; but the Church and the brewers are always in agreement with the great financiers, who take care never to interfere with their partisans’ income. After all, as a Minister is but a man who holds fast to his office, to his power, and to the possibilities of enrichment which his post offers to him and to his supporters, it necessarily follows that the question of international relations is nowadays finally reduced to knowing whether the favoured monopolists of a particular State will take such or such an attitude towards the favourites of the same calibre in another State.
Kropotkin, Wars and Capital