Liberal international order
In The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (Yale University Press, 2018) Mearsheimer presents a critique of the geopolitical strategy he refers to as “liberal hegemony.” His definition of liberal hegemony includes a three-part designation of it as an extension of Woodrow Wilson’s original initiatives to make the world safe by turning its governments into democracies, turning geopolitical economic initiatives towards open markets compatible with democratic governments, and opening up and promoting other democratically liberal international social and culture societies on a global scale of inclusion. Mearsheimer stated in an interview broadcast on CSPAN that liberal hegemony represents a “great delusion” and that much more weight should be associated with nationalism as a policy of enduring geopolitical value than the delusions he associated with liberal hegemony.
In a related 2019 article, Mearsheimer argued that the US-led liberal international order had been destined to collapse from its inception. Contrary to scholars such as G. John Ikenberry, who trace the origins of the liberal international order to the early Cold War, he asserted that the Cold War liberal order had in fact been a “bounded order,” designed to help the United States and its allies compete more effectively against the communist bloc. Although the US-led order became truly international after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the policies that undergird the order tended to precipitate its demise to the point that “[e]ven if Western policymakers had been wiser stewards of that order, they could not have extended its longevity in any meaningful way” (p. 30). In particular, US-led efforts to expand the order’s membership by spreading democracy were bound to backfire by provoking nationalist resistance, embroiling the US in disastrous military adventures, and stoking hostility among rival powers such as Russia and China. Liberal internationalist policies also tended to collide with nationalism and economic concerns within the liberal countries themselves, as illustrated by key events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency. Finally, the drive to integrate rising powers such as China into the liberal international order effectively “helped China become a great power, thus undercutting unipolarity, which is essential for maintaining a liberal world order” (p. 42).
Mearsheimer concluded by predicting that the liberal international order would be replaced by three distinct “realist orders” in the near term: “a thin international order,” primarily concerned with arms control and managing the global economy, and two bounded orders, led respectively by China and the United States (p. 44).
His claims about the liberal international order have sparked a lively debate and prompted responses from scholars such as Robert Jervis, Christopher Layne, Jennifer Pitts, Jack Snyder, William C. Wohlforth, and C. William Walldorf.
Why Leaders Lie
Main article: Why Leaders Lie
Mearsheimer wrote a book, Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, 2011), which analyzes lying in international politics. He argues that leaders lie to foreign audiences because they think that it is good for their country. For example, he maintains that US President Franklin Roosevelt lied about the Greer incident in September 1941 because he was deeply committed to getting America into World War II, which he thought was in its national interest.
His two main findings are that leaders actually do not lie very much to other countries and that democratic leaders are actually more likely than autocrats to lie to their own people. Thus, he starts his book by saying that it is not surprising that Saddam Hussein did not lie when he said that he had weapons of mass destruction but that George W. Bush and some of his key advisors lied to the American people about the threat from Iraq. Mearsheimer argues that leaders are most likely to lie to their own people in democracies that fight wars of choice in distant places. He says that it is difficult for leaders to lie to other countries because there is not much trust among them, especially when security issues are at stake, and trust is needed for lying to be effective. Mearsheimer states that it is easier for leaders to lie to their own people because there is usually a good deal of trust between them.
Mearsheimer does not consider the moral dimension of international lying, which he views from a utilitarian perspective. He argues that there are five types of international lies.
Inter-state lies occur if the leader of one country lies to a leader of another country or, more generally, any foreign audience, to induce a desired reaction.
Fear-mongering occurs if a leader lies to his or her own domestic public.
Strategic cover-ups are lies to prevent controversial policies and deals from being made known publicly.
Nationalist myths are stories about a country’s past that portray that country in a positive light and its adversaries in a negative light.
Liberal lies are given to clear up the negative reputation of institutions, individuals, or actions.
He explains the reasons for leaders pursuing each of the different kinds of lies. His central thesis is that leaders lie more frequently to domestic audiences than to leaders of other states. That is because international lying can have negative effects, including “blowback” and “backfiring.”
Blowback occurs if telling international lies helps cause a culture of deceit at home. Backfiring occurs if telling a lie leads to a failed policy. He also emphasizes that there are two other kinds of deception besides lying: “concealment,” a leader remaining silent about an important matter, and “spinning,” a leader telling a story that emphasizes the positive and downplays or ignores the negative.
In 2011, John Mearsheimer wrote a back-cover blurb for controversial author Gilad Atzmon’s book The Wandering Who? A Study of Jewish Identity Politics: “Gilad Atzmon has written a fascinating and provocative book on Jewish identity in the modern world. He shows how assimilation and liberalism are making it increasingly difficult for Jews in the Diaspora to maintain a powerful sense of their ‘Jewishness.’ Panicked Jewish leaders, he argues, have turned to Zionism (blind loyalty to Israel) and scaremongering (the threat of another Holocaust) to keep the tribe united and distinct from the surrounding goyim. As Atzmon’s own case demonstrates, this strategy is not working and is causing many Jews great anguish. The Wandering Who? should be widely read by Jews and non-Jews alike.”
Mearsheimer’s endorsement of Atzmon’s book was met with accusations of antisemitism by prominent Jewish writers and intellectuals. Alan Dershowitz wrote an article in response, “Why are John Mearsheimer and Richard Falk Endorsing a Blatantly Anti-Semitic Book?” It stated that the book “argues that Jews seek to control the world.”
Mearsheimer denied the charges of antisemitism in that he had “no reason to amend it or embellish” his blurb and defended his position. Writing in regard to the charge by Goldberg that Atzmon is anti-Semitic and, by implication, so is his positive review of Atzmon’s book, Mearsheimer responded: “Atzmon’s basic point is that Jews often talk in universalistic terms, but many of them think and act in particularistic terms. One might say they talk like liberals but act like nationalists…. It is in this context that he discusses what he calls the ‘Holocaust religion,’ Zionism, and Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. Again, to be perfectly clear, he has no animus toward Judaism as a religion or with individuals who are Jewish by birth.”
He became World Bank Chief Economist in October 2016. He resigned on 24 January 2018, following a controversy in which he stated in an interview with The Wall Street Journal on January 12, that during the tenure of Chile’s socialist President Michelle Bachelet from 2014 onwards, Chile’s ranking for ease of doing business had been downgraded by the World Bank as a result of changes of methodology which he claimed may have been politically motivated, a claim denied by the former World Bank economist responsible for compiling Chile’s ranking, Chilean economist Augusto Lopez-Claros.
In 1972 Nordhaus, along with fellow Yale economics professor James Tobin, published Is Growth Obsolete?, an article that introduced the Measure of Economic Welfare (Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare) as the first attempt to develop environmental accounting.
The World is Dedollarizing, by Peter Koenig .#GrubStreetJournal #GrubStreetPolitics #GrubStreetGeoPolitics #GrubStreetPoliticalEconomy #GrubStreetMoneyandFinance #ConquestofDough #TidesofTheDollarMoonaPoem
well worth a read. (https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/International%20Security_Bound%20to%20Fail.pdf)
https://notthegrubstreetjournal.com/2022/02/04/failing-lies-man-made-climate-change-the-2019-2020-flu-season-plandemic-the-lies-based-international-order-stuttering-towards-oblivion-ours-or-theirs/ I have cut and paste a few thoughts into a bloog this morning but plan on doing some more work on the Mearshimer essay.
the new realist orders
There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future:
a thin international order and two thick bounded orders—one led by China,
the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be
concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the
global economy work efªciently P.38
LEARN WHY SOROS COMPARED XI JINPING TO ‘HITLER’
The thin order is the CBDC, I think Soros throwing his toys out of the pram and Boris’s difficulties indicate that their faction is now in terminal decline.
In military matters, the three emerging orders built around the U.S.-China
“rivalry should bear a marked resemblance to the three Cold War orders, albeit
with China taking the place of the Soviet Union.
No such parallels exist in the economic realm, however. There was little economic intercourse between the superpowers or their respective orders for most
of the Cold War. Thus, the existing international order was not concerned in
any meaningful way with facilitating economic relations between the two
sides. Economic dealings were largely conªned to the bounded orders, and
there the main objective was to pursue policies that would help gain advantage over the other side. Because economic power underpins military power,
waging security competition was carried out in both the economic and military domains”.
“Made in China 2025,” for example,
is Beijing’s plan to dominate global markets in a wide range of hightech products. China’s strategy is to give large government subsidies to stateowned companies and supplement their research with technology stolen
from American and other Western companies.”90 China is also using its growing economic power to coerce its neighbors in East Asia to side with Beijing
The two bounded orders, which are beginning to form, will include institutions that aim to foster economic cooperation among their members, while
seeking to gain economic advantage over the rival order. The Obama administration, for example, explicitly designed the Trans-Paciªc Partnership for this
purpose, although Trump withdrew from it after he became president. China’s
highly ambitious “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which was launched in
2013, is designed not just to help China sustain its impressive economic
growth, but also to project Chinese military and political power around the
globe. And because the United States refused to join the Asian Infrastructure
Development Bank, that impressive institution is likely to become a central
part of the China-led bounded order.
In short, the rivalry between the China-led and U.S.-led bounded orders will
involve both full-throated economic and military competition, as was the case
with the bounded orders dominated by Moscow and Washington during
the Cold War
First, it should resist any temptation to continue trying to forcefully spread democracy across the planet via regime change. Because the United States will be compelled to engage in balance
of power politics with China and Russia, its ability to engage in social engineering abroad will be sharply limited. The temptation to remake the world
will always be there, however, because the United States believes so fervently
in the virtues of liberal democracy. But it should resist that temptation, because
going on liberal crusades is certain to lead to serious trouble.
Second, the United States should seek to maximize its inºuence in the economic institutions that will make up the emerging international order. Doing
so is important for maintaining as favorable a position as possible in the evolving global distribution of power. After all, economic power is the basis of military power. It is imperative that Washington not allow China to dominate
those institutions and use the resulting inºuence to gain power at the United
Third, U.S. policymakers should ensure that they create a formidable
bounded order that can contain Chinese expansion. That task mandates creating economic institutions such as the Trans-Paciªc Partnership and a military
alliance in Asia that is similar to NATO during the Cold War. In the process,
the United States should go to great lengths to pull Russia out of China’s orbit
and integrate it into the U.S.-led order.
In sum, the time has come for the U.S. foreign policy establishment to recognize that the liberal international order was a failed enterprise with no future.
The orders that will matter for the foreseeable future are realist orders that
must be fashioned to serve the United States’ interests.