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Flu d’état, Part 2. Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic. OCTOBER 3, 2021 #Covidstroika ITS A DIGITAL BANK PASSPORT NOT A VACCINE PASSPORT #QED.

   March 15, 2023  1 Comment

Flu d’état, Part 2. Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic. OCTOBER 3, 2021 #Covidstroika ITS A DIGITAL BANK PASSPORT NOT A VACCINE PASSPORT #QED.

 

OCTOBER 3, 2021

Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic. #Covidstroika ITS A DIGITAL BANK PASSPORT NOT A VACCINE PASSPORT #QED. @NAOMIRWOLF @financialeyes @JoeBlob20 @Pathos14658352 @DavidGolemXIV

NOVEMBER 10, 2021

Larry & Carstens’ Excellent Pandemic #RichPlanet Covid 19 is a monetary event.

 DECEMBER 9, 2021

The Central Bank Coup det Tat. Hugh Hendry and Prof. Richard Werner , Are we headed for A 90’s style “Japanese” lost decade? #WAGTHECOV

JANUARY 13, 2022

“a state of semi-permanent health emergency is preferable to a vertical market crash that would turn the memory of 2008 into a walk in the park.” September 17th 20019 #RepoSpike #GoingDirect

This is an excellent article and analysis. The driving motivation behind the accelerated rush to a Techno Fascist Feudalism has been occupying my mind for the years leading up to the Repo Spike in New York in September 2019.
In the Financialised economy and with the CBDC push tied to DIgital Id’s, we see a symptom of the appearance of what the system is trying to preserve, namely itself and its Monopoly ingroup. The real Economy is put in the position of trying to make bricks without straw, a misallocation of resources, and the Credit tokens to acquire those resources.
The Dominant Resource tieing the Financial system’s real potentials to the Real potentials of the real economy is the Flow of Energy resources and Primary resources through the economy. It would seem that a Hard limit on available energy to sustain the present industrial output of the global economy has been hit, what seems inexplicable is the Priorities touted in narratives regarding Why our largest Energy Sources the Hydro Carbons, Gas, Oil and Coal, and the largest potential replacement for them Nuclear are being demonised?

 

The Central Bankers’ Long Covid: An Incurable Condition

The purpose of the ‘pandemic’ was to accelerate the pre-existing macrotrend of monetary expansion, while postponing inflationary damage. Following the Federal Reserve, the world’s central bankers have created oceans of liquidity, thus devaluing their currencies to the detriment of populations. While this continues, the transnational turbo-capital of the elites keeps expanding in the financial orbit, absorbing those small and medium size businesses it has depressed and destroyed. In other words, there is no such thing as a free lunch (for us). The Central Bank’s money-printer works only for the 0.0001% – with the help of Virus, or a global threat of equal traction.

In the meantime, ordinary people are caught in a suffocating double bind. If credit needs to be made available to businesses, Central Banks must keep a lid on inflation, which they can do only… by draining credit! Runaway inflation can be avoided only by containing the disruptive effects of excessive money creation; that is, by bringing work-based societies to their knees. Most of us end up squashed between price inflation of essential goods, and deflationary liquidity drainage via loss of income and erosion of savings. And in a stagnant economy with inflation off the chart, each suppressed business transaction is channeled into financial assets.

A tool preventing liquidity from reaching the real economy is the Federal Reserve’s Overnight Reverse Repo facility (RRP). While continuing to flood financial markets with freshly printed money, thanks to reverse repos the Fed mops up any excess of that very cash it pumps into Wall Street. Effectively, a zero-sum game of give and take: at night, financial operators deposit their excess liquidity with the Federal Reserve, which delivers as collateral the same Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed Securities it drains from the market during the day as part of its QE purchases. In August 2021, the Fed’s usage of RRP topped $1 trillion, which led the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to double the RRP limit to $160 billion, starting from 23 September 2021.

Here, then, is the elephant in the room: how will the Fed’s taper square with reverse repos of this astronomical magnitude? Is the much-anticipated reduction of monetary stimulus even possible with a global financial bubble fuelled by zero-interest-rate leveraging and structural borrowing? But, at the same time, how can central bankers continue to expand their balance sheet, when the double whammy of stagnation and rising inflation (stagflation) is just around the corner?

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Systemic Collapse and Pandemic Simulation

MARCH 2, 2023

Mark to Market, The Liars Lexicon #GFC2 #LiarsLexicon #MarktoMarket #SHitHitsFan

https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/02/available-for-sale-understanding-bank-securities-portfolios/

Before going further, let’s step back to consider a few reasons why banking firms choose to own securities in addition to or instead of loans.

1. Banks may face an imbalance between their access to deposit finance or other low-cost funding and their profitable lending opportunities. This could be the result of geographic factors, shocks to credit demand or to deposits, or other factors. In such cases, funding-rich banks may choose to invest in securities that reflect lending by other banks or by nonbank lenders (e.g., mortgage-backed securities issued by another lender), or direct debt issuance by nonfinancial firms (e.g., corporate bonds).

2. Relatedly, a bank concerned about liquidity risk may be attracted to securities because of their liquidity; that is, they can be sold more easily and with lower price impact than loans, for which the secondary market is less active. Liquidity concerns may also be driven by regulation—going forward, the liquidity coverage ratio developed as part of the Basel III Capital Accord requires banks to hold enough high-quality liquid assets to meet their liquidity needs under a thirty-day liquidity stress scenario.

3. From a risk management point of view, holding securities may help the bank diversify or mitigate its risk exposures. Conversely, adjusting securities holdings can provide a straightforward way for banks to ramp up their level of risk in an effort to increase expected returns. For example, recent research argues that banks respond to expansionary monetary policy by lengthening the maturity of their securities portfolios, in an effort to boost yields.

4. Holding securities portfolios may help the banking firm perform other financial services. For example, broker-dealers maintain an inventory of securities to allow them to act as market makers, matching buyers and sellers in financial markets and providing liquidity to those markets.

5. In some cases, holding securities instead of loans may be partially or mainly motivated by regulatory arbitrage—helping the firm reduce its capital requirements or provide other types of regulatory relief, perhaps without substantially reducing the overall risk to the firm.

steph pomboy @spomboy Called Out the Ides of March and the #SPVcollapse @JohnTitus

At the end of Q2 2022, the US banking industry had $2.2 trillion in total capital. That is, book equity. But much of total capital is not tangible, which is why regulators use Tier 1 Capital as the base measure for solvency. The legal definition of Tier 1 Capital, which excludes many items we discuss below, is found at 12 CFR Part 324 of the federal banking regulations. Specifically, the law:

“requires that several items be fully deducted from common equity tier 1 capital, such as goodwill, deferred tax assets (DTAs) that arise from net operating loss and tax credit carry-forwards, other intangible assets (except for mortgage servicing assets (MSAs)), certain DTAs arising from temporary differences (temporary difference DTAs), gains on sale of securitization exposures, and certain investments in another financial institution’s capital instruments. Additionally, management must adjust for unrealized gains or losses on certain cash flow hedges.”

Of note, when adopted in 2015, CFR Part 324 allowed all non-advanced approach institutions (aka little banks) to make a permanent, one-time opt-out election, enabling them to calculate regulatory capital without AOCI. At the time, accumulated other comprehensive income was a minor entry on bank balance sheets and income statements, minor as in the footnotes. In the age of QE, however, AOCI is now a much bigger deal, but still is dwarfed by how QE has caused unrealized losses on bank balance sheets.

So, let’s begin the fun with the fire-sale calculation we perform using the aggregate data from the FDIC. We start with total capital, the broadest definition of bank equity. We then subtract the goodwill and all of the intangibles. (H/T to Jake for catching error in earlier edition.)

U.S. Banking Industry

Source: FDIC
The question for investors/depositors: how much duration risk did each bank take in its investment portfolio
during the deposit surge, and how much was invested at the lows in yields? As a proxy for these questions
now that rates have risen, we can examine the impact on capital ratios from an assumed immediate realization
of unrealized securities losses (see next page for an explanation of our methodology). That’s what is shown in
the first chart: again, SIVB was in investment duration world of its own at the end of 2022, which is remarkable
given its funding profile shown earlier, and its elevated share of uninsured depositors shown on the next page3

The purpose of this Blog is to compare the current problems in the US banking sector with the possibilities of something similar happening in the UK.

Just when it occurs to me here is a Blog done about the collapse of Northern Rock in the UK.

https://garethrees.org/2008/10/18/northern-rock/

And although the mortgages making up the security are carefully tabulated by type of property, location of property, loan-to-value ratio, outstanding balance, mortgage product type, employment status, interest rate, type of repayment plan, there’s no tabulation by debt-to-income ratio (surely a crucial predictor of default) and no tabulation by degree of certification of income (for all we know, 55% of the loans in the prospectus might be self-certified).

Despite these warning signs, the 2007-2 issue was underwritten in May 2007 by Lehman Brothers (who filed for bankruptcy in September 2008), Merrill Lynch (sold to Bank of America in September 2008), and Barclays (still extant at time of writing).

So what changed between May and September? What’s clear to me from reading the prospectus is that there’s really no way to tell from a securitization document like that whether the underlying security is a good investment or not: the data necessary to work it out is missing. (Whether that’s by bad luck or by design I don’t know.) If you are going to invest in the security, you do so because you trust that the issuing bank has done its job and applied suitable underwriting standards, and is not trying to mislead you. By September 2007 it was clear that the banking system in general had completely failed to be worthy of this trust, and that meant that no-one was willing to purchase Northern Rock’s securities.

For all I know, maybe Northern Rock’s loans have been made prudently and the risks from their “fast track” procedure are small in practice. But since Northern Rock had 8% of the mortgage business in the UK in 2007 it seems more likely that they suffered from a good admixture of fraudulent and over-extended loans.

So, to summarize the story so far:

  1. From 1999, Northern Rock came to rely on securitization to fund its mortgage lending.
  2. From 2004, Northern Rock relaxed its mortgage lending standards.
  3. The bad consequences of the lowered lending standards become so obvious that no investor could fail to see them, so Northern Rock’s September 2007 security issue failed.
  4. Northern Rock ran out of cash.

(I think this is the conventional wisdom, but I feel somewhat more confident having worked through the evidence.)

This story raises some questions. How did Northern Rock come to rely on securitization, and why did it relax its lending standards? Since every issue of securities from 2004 very likely had some problems with self-certified loans, why didn’t those issues fail too?

Undoubtedly the greed, stupidity, and short-sightedness of Northern Rock’s management are going to feature in the explanations, but since Northern Rock is far from the only bank where roughly the same sequence of events transpired, it seems to me that we need a general explanation.

Which I am confident will support my politics.

I guess the Northern rock segue into the UK banking regulation scene is not too bad, of course, this time is always different in all matters of finance and Gordon Brown told us all those years ago as Jeremy Hunt may well tell us later today that “We saw the end of Boom and Bust”

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/sep/11/gordonbrown.economy

No return to boom and bust: what Brown said when he was chancellor

This article is more than 14 years old

The prime minister, Gordon Brown, today accepted responsibility for Labour’s continuing poor performance in the opinion polls.

But he also laid some of the blame on the global economy.

“I am explaining to you that if you go around the world, you will see that every country is affected,” he said.

The reason such comments provoke skepticism is because Brown’s mantra during his 10 years at the Treasury was that his prudence as chancellor of the exchequer would ensure there would never be a return to “boom and bust” economics.

Year after year, the message was the same:

May 20, 1997, speech by the chancellor to the CBI: Exploiting the British genius – the key to long-term economic success:
“Stability is necessary for our future economic success. The British economy of the future must be built not on the shifting sands of boom and bust, but on the bedrock of prudent and wise economic management for the long term. It is only these firm foundations that we can raise Britain’s underlying economic performance.”

  • Money and Credit – January 2023

    Our monthly Money and Credit statistical release is made up of three parts: broad money and credit, lending to individual and lending to businesses.

    Published on 01 March 2023

  • Non-financial businesses withdrew £20.3 billion of deposits from banks and building societies in all currencies. This marked the highest withdrawal from UK non-financial businesses on record (series starting in July 2009).

Capital Issuance – January 2023

The capital issuance statistics consist of non-government primary market issuance of bonds, commercial paper and equity, representing finance raised by UK resident entities.
Published on 27 February 2023

Key points

  • Net issuance by UK residents was £15.2bn in January, compared to £0.2bn in December and the previous six-month average of £3.5bn (Chart 1).
  • The increase in net issuance was driven by gross capital issuance which was £50.2bn in January, compared to £33.4bn in December and the previous six-month average of £45.0bn (Chart 1).
  • Driving the increase in gross issuance was commercial paper which was £21.8bn in January, compared to £12.6bn in December and the previous six-month average of £20.5bn (Chart 3).

In addition to the summary statistics contained within this release and the associated tables, the Bank publishes a number of more granular series; please see our Bankstats tables (E3.1) and the full list of series and interactive charts.

All sectors

  • Gross capital issuance by UK residents was £50.2bn in January, compared to £33.4bn in December and the previous six-month average of £45.0bn (Chart 1).
  • Net issuance was £15.2bn in January, compared to £0.2bn in December and the previous six-month average of £3.5bn (Chart 1).

Commercial paper issuance

  • Gross commercial paper issuance was £21.8bn in January, compared to £12.6bn in December and the previous six-month average of £20.5bn (Chart 3).
  • Net commercial paper issuance was £6.3bn in January, compared to -£3.8bn in December and the previous six-month average of £1.0bn (Chart 3).
  • The increase in net issuance was driven by increased issuance from the MFI and PNFC sectors of £7.0bn and £2.8bn respectively, combined with a decrease in repayments of £1.9bn by the OFC sector.

Chart 3: Commercial paper issuance by UK residents (all currencies)

Non seasonally adjusted

Equity issuance

  • Gross equity issuance was £0.1bn in January, compared to £0.3bn in December and the previous six-month average of £0.5bn (Chart 4).
  • Net equity issuance was -£2.3bn in January, compared to -£2.5bn in December and the previous six-month average of -£3.2bn (Chart 4).
  • The increase in net issuance was driven by a decrease in buybacks of £0.4bn by the PNFC sector, which more than offset the decrease in issuance across all sectors.

Chart 4: Equity issuance by UK residents (all currencies)

Non seasonally adjusted

Key

  • PNFC = Private non-financial corporation
  • MFI = Monetary financial institution
  • OFC = Other financial corporation
  • Other sectors = Other sectors contains public corporations and non-profit institutions serving households
  • CP = Commercial paper

FSA001 – Balance sheet – FCA Handbook

Banking sector regulatory capital – 2022 Q3

This quarterly statistical release shows levels of capital and risk-weighted assets for the UK banking sector. It includes breakdowns of the movements in different tiers of capital and risk exposure types, and overall capital ratios.
Published on 16 December 2022
Published on 16 December 2022

Key points

  • The Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio for the UK banking sector increased slightly by 0.1 percentage points on the quarter to 15.6%.
  • The level of CET1 capital increased by 4.7% on the quarter, from £468bn to £490bn.
  • There was a 4.1% increase in total risk-weighted assets on the quarter, from £3,010bn to £3,132bn.

Definitions of capital

CRD IV imposes capital requirements with reference to different types, or ‘tiers’ of capital, which are referred to throughout the Banking Sector Regulatory Capital statistical release. The definitions of these are set out in full in the Capital Requirements Regulation. The most important terms for reading this statistical release are set out below:

  • Common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital includes paid-up capital and its associated share premium accounts, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income, other reserves, and funds for general banking risk. CET1 capital must be available to the institution for unrestricted and immediate use to cover risks or losses as soon as these occur.
  • Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital consists of paid-up capital instruments and their associated share premium account. Typically, they are issued as hybrid debt instruments (contingent convertibles), which are able to be written down or converted to CET1 instruments upon the occurrence of a trigger event. This trigger event occurs when the institution’s CET1 capital ratio falls either below 5.125%, or a level higher than 5.125% if specified in the terms of the instrument. AT1 instruments must not have any features that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution if the trigger event occurs.
  • Tier 1 capital for an institution is the sum of its CET1 and AT1 capital.
  • Tier 2 capital consists of capital instruments and subordinated loans and their associated premium accounts. The claim on the instrument or loan must be wholly subordinated to the claims of all non-subordinated creditors, and should not be secured or subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of its claim.
  • Total capital for an institution is the sum of its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.

For a more complete set of definitions, please see the full Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013), articles 26-64.

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/details/further-details-about-banking-sector-regulatory-capital-data

 

Definitions of capital

CRD IV imposes capital requirements with reference to different types, or ‘tiers’ of capital, which are referred to throughout the Banking Sector Regulatory Capital statistical release. The definitions of these are set out in full in the Capital Requirements Regulation. The most important terms for reading this statistical release are set out below:

  • Common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital includes paid-up capital and its associated share premium accounts, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income, other reserves, and funds for general banking risk. CET1 capital must be available to the institution for unrestricted and immediate use to cover risks or losses as soon as these occur.
  • Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital consists of paid-up capital instruments and their associated share premium account. Typically, they are issued as hybrid debt instruments (contingent convertibles), which are able to be written down or converted to CET1 instruments upon the occurrence of a trigger event. This trigger event occurs when the institution’s CET1 capital ratio falls either below 5.125%, or a level higher than 5.125% if specified in the terms of the instrument. AT1 instruments must not have any features that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution if the trigger event occurs.
  • Tier 1 capital for an institution is the sum of its CET1 and AT1 capital.
  • Tier 2 capital consists of capital instruments and subordinated loans and their associated premium accounts. The claim on the instrument or loan must be wholly subordinated to the claims of all non-subordinated creditors, and should not be secured or subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of its claim.
  • Total capital for an institution is the sum of its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.

For a more complete set of definitions, please see the full Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013), articles 26-64.

Risk-weighted assets

CRD IV imposes capital requirements in relation to an institution’s total risk exposure amount. This is a regulatory concept that weights the accounting value of a firm’s assets and credit exposures according to an assessment of each exposure’s potential to suffer loss. Institutions are able to calculate risk-weighted exposures using either the Standardised Approach, or the Internal Ratings-Based approach (if permitted by their local competent authority). Both are described briefly below:

  • Standardised approach: under this approach, the risk-weighted exposure amount is the accounting value of the asset item’s exposure after credit risk adjustments. It is multiplied by a risk weight according to the exposure class of the original asset item. The risk weights are percentages which are standardised according to the class of the exposure, and in some cases the institution counterparty, to reflect the riskiness of that asset class. The risk weights for different asset classes are provided in the Capital Requirements Regulation. For more detail on calculating risk-weighted exposures under the standardised approach, see Chapter 2 of the Capital Requirements Regulation.
  •  Internal ratings-based (IRB) approach: under this approach, institutions calculate risk-weighted exposures by internally estimating parameters such as the exposure’s loss given default, exposure at default and default correlation across exposures within a class. For more detail on calculating risk-weighted exposures under the IRB Approach, see Chapter 3 of the Capital Requirements Regulation.

The values for risk-weighted exposures used throughout this publication are from COREP form CA2 (own funds requirements). The risk exposure groupings used in the publication were made according to the risk groupings within form CA2, and the total for each grouping is the sum of exposures for that grouping calculated using the Standardised Approach and the IRB Approach.

Capital requirements under CRD IV and the CRR

The CRR (Article 92) sets out minimum endpoint requirements for institutions’ own funds. These are as follows:

  • a CET1 capital ratio of 4.5%
  • a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6% and
  • a total capital ratio of 8%.

The CET1 capital ratio is the CET1 capital of the institution as a percentage of its total risk-weighted assets.

The Tier 1 capital ratio is the Tier 1 capital of the institution as a percentage of its total risk-weighted assets.

The total capital ratio is the total capital (own funds) of the institution as a percentage of its total risk-weighted assets.

The requirements set out above are referred to as Pillar 1 requirements. In addition, the UK’s capital framework also includes both Pillar 2 capital requirements that apply to individual banks and system-wide buffers of equity to absorb stress. More details on the capital framework are available in the supplement to the December 2015 Financial Stability Report: ‘The framework of capital requirements for UK banks’.

At present, the CET1 capital ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio can be calculated on a transitional or an endpoint basis. The difference between these two bases is that using a transitional basis allows institutions to phase in deductions from CET1 over five years, increasing by 20% every year until 2019, and can phase out some instruments that do not meet CRR standards until 2022. In the publication, the CET1 capital ratios and Tier 1 capital ratios presented are based on transitional calculations of CET1 and Tier 1 capital, as reported by institutions in COREP forms CA1 (own funds) and CA2 (own funds requirements).

Click to access Barclays-PLC-Pillar-3-Report-2021.pdf

Click to access Barclays-Bank-PLC-Pillar-3-Report%202022.pdf

ED. 2022 figures are Own Funds hence the apparent big difference. ( Still analyzing ) purpose of the post is to get an apples-for-apples comparison with the US position Vis Fed and UK position vis Boe.

Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capitalb
25,907 28,592 27,420 24,765 23,928
1a Fully loaded common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capitalc
25,571 28,230 27,133 24,520 23,376

https://home.barclays/content/dam/home-barclays/documents/investor-relations/reports-and-events/annual-reports/2022/AR/Barclays-Bank-PLC-AR-2022.pdf

Banks Balance Sheet in the United Kingdom decreased to 4442664 GBP Million in January from 4482896 GBP Million in December of 2022. source: Bank of England

Banks Balance Sheet in the United Kingdom is expected to be 4555000.00 GBP Million by the end of this quarter, according to Trading Economics global macro models and analysts expectations.

Banks Balance Sheet in the United Kingdom averaged 3832163.40 GBP Million from 2010 until 2023, reaching an all time high of 4550346.00 GBP Million in May of 2022 and a record low of 3342179.00 GBP Million in September of 2014. This page provides – United Kingdom Banks Balance Sheet – actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news. United Kingdom Banks Balance Sheet – values, historical data and charts – was last updated on March of 2023.

Banks Balance Sheet in the United States increased to 23014.30 USD Billion in February 15 from 22960.60 USD Billion in the previous week. source: Federal Reserve

Banks Balance Sheet in the United States is expected to be 23500.00 USD Billion by the end of this quarter, according to Trading Economics global macro models and analysts expectations.

Banks Balance Sheet in the United States averaged 7349.93 USD Billion from 1973 until 2023, reaching an all time high of 23137.70 USD Billion in December of 2022 and a record low of 697.60 USD Billion in January of 1973. This page provides – United States Banks Balance Sheet – actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news. United States Banks Balance Sheet – values, historical data and charts – was last updated on March of 2023.

https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/banks-balance-sheet

Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic.
UK Banks and Bank of England Balance Sheet Ratio
2010 350,000,000,000 central bank 4,000,000,000,000 banks 8.75%

2016 400,000,000,000 CB 3,400,000,000,000 banks 11.76%

September 2021 1,000,000,000,000 cb 4,200,000,000,000 banks 23.81%

 

 

“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”, Setting Sail on the good ship SONIA. @PerKurowski

The ESG Kleptocracy.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lynn_Forester_de_Rothschild

Lynn Forester de Rothschild

Lynn Forester de Rothschild
Born
Lynn Forester

July 2, 1954 (age 68)

Bergen County, New Jersey, U.S.
Education
Political party Democratic
Spouses
Alexander Platt
​
​

(m. 1978, divorced)​

​
​

(m. 1983; div. 1993)​

​
​

(m. 2000)​
Children 2

Lynn Forester, Lady de Rothschild (born July 2, 1954) is an American-British billionaire businesswoman who is the chief executive officer of E.L. Rothschild, a holding company she owns (previously together with her third husband, Sir Evelyn Robert de Rothschild, a member of the Rothschild family, until his death).[1]

The company manages investments in The Economist Group, owner of The Economist magazine, Congressional Quarterly and the Economist Intelligence Unit, E.L. Rothschild LP, a leading independent wealth management firm in the United States, as well as real estate, agricultural and food interests.[2]

She publicly supports many politicians including Hillary Clinton.[3] She rallies for a political movement called Inclusive Capitalism Initiative, and led the Conference of Inclusive Capitalism in London in 2014 and 2015, and founded the Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism.[4]

Inclusive Capital Partners

Countryside’s top shareholder urges company to find buyer after Inclusive bid

By 
 and 

“The board is confident that, with a clear strategy in place following the operational review announced on 7 April 2022, Countryside has a strong platform to deliver value in excess of the proposals,” Countryside said, referring to In-Cap’s potential offer.

In-Cap said Countryside would be in a better position to turnaround its business as a private company rather than as a public entity as it continues to recover from manufacturing losses and costly expansions which hit half-year profit.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sezCH6KdepAvLECcqGPCGp1Srlt8JuD2/view?usp=sharing

The ESG Kleptocracy.

The Bridge between the Kleptocracy and the Kakistocracy, The Federal Reserve and the treasury.

What Breaks First,

Unite behind the science event with greta thunberg At COP-25 in Madrid in December 2019.#4Pamphleteers @GrubStreetJorno @wiki_ballot @financialeyes @JoeBlob20 #ClimateChange #Science #PolitcalEconomy #CarbonCurrency #EnergyEconomics #CircularEconomy #Technocracy #Eugenics #LimitsToGrowth #ClubofRome #CFR #NaomiSeibt #GretaThunberg

Population, Resources, and Energy in the Global Economy: A Vindication of Herman Daly’s Vision Jonathan M. Harris February 2013

http://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2019/06/13-03HarrisDaly.pdf

Selection_342

https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/

Selection_341

http://www.bu.edu/eci/education-materials/textbooks/

ENRE4EuropeanMacroPrinciples2EMAC_3e_SmMicro4E_sm

Global Development and Environment Institute

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Global Development And Environment Institute
GDAE (Global Development And Environment Institute) at Tufts University Logo.jpg
Abbreviation GDAE
Formation 1993
Type research center
Headquarters Tufts University, United States
Co-directors
 Neva Goodwin
William Moomaw
Website ase.tufts.edu/gdae/

The Global Development And Environment Institute (GDAE, pronounced “gee-day”) is a research center at Tufts University founded in 1993. GDAE conducts research and develops teaching materials in economics and related areas that follow an interdisciplinary approach that emphasizes ecological, cultural, social, and institutional factors. The Institute has produced more than twenty books and numerous articles, policy documents, and discussion papers. These materials are being used in academic settings, to enhance the teaching of economics and related subjects, and in policy circles, where GDAE researchers are recognized leaders in their fields.

Texts and educational modules developed at GDAE are now being distributed and managed through Boston University’s Economics in Context Initiative. This carries forward the effort to develop a truly “contextual economics” – one that takes full account of humanity’s social and physical environments.

GDAE’s current research and educational efforts are centered in three areas: “Land, Energy, and Climate”, Green Economics, and educational materials in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics.  GDAE researchers present their research in a series of policy briefs, working papers, and at numerous conferences. Publications reflecting GDAE’s earlier research in areas such as globalization, trade, and feminist economics are frequently cited and are available for download.

Personnel[edit]

Neva Goodwin and William Moomaw are Co-Directors of GDAE. Other members of the research team are Jonathan M. Harris, Brian Roach and Anne-Marie Codur. Monica Barros is responsible for administration and communications. Gillian Davies, Andrew Tirrell, and David Sussman  are Visiting Scholars at GDAE, and Jeronim Capaldo is a research fellow. Bethany Tietjen and Josephine Watson are GDAE Research Assistants.

Research[edit]

GDAE’s research program emphasizes ecological health and the correlation between social and economic well-being. They view economic systems in physical contexts of technology and the natural world, as well as in the social/psychological contexts of history, politics, ethics, culture, institutions, and human motivations.

Publications[edit]

GDAE has extensive publication record, including the production of the ‘In-Context’ series of textbooks and free teaching modules which are now managed by the Economics in Context Initiative at Boston University.

Textbooks[edit]

The textbooks in question include Microeconomics in Context, Macroeconomics in Context, Macroeconomics in Context (European Edition), Principles of Economics in Context, Environmental and Resource Economics and the soon to be published Essentials of Economics in Context.

These textbooks present all the content required of a standard text yet also go beyond this material to offer a more holistic approach to understanding economic processes by integrating aspects of history, institutions, gender, inequality, and the environment.

The texts come with a full set of supplementary materials including instructor resource material with lecture outlines, a test bank of over 2,000 questions, and PowerPoint slides. Detailed student study guides are available for free download.

Modules[edit]

GDAE has also produced an extensive set of teaching modules that are designed for use as stand-alone supplements in undergraduate or graduate-level courses. These modules are available as free downloadable PDFs.  They range from 25-60 pages, and most include discussion questions and glossary. The teaching modules are designed to allow instructors to easily incorporate the teaching modules into one or more weeks of weeks of semester alongside whatever textbooks they are using.

Frontier Issues in Economic Thought[edit]

GDAE produced the six-volume series, Frontier Issues in Economic Thought, which was published by Island Press. The articles that GDAE researchers selected and summarized for this project focus on the limitations of the mainstream economic paradigm and a wide range of creative efforts that have been and are being made to extend economic understanding.

Social Science Library: Frontier Thinking in Sustainable Development and Human Well-being[edit]

GDAE has produced an electronic collection of publications that are available for free to universities in 138 nations, with special attention to those institutions that are most in need of library resources. The collection, or the Social Science Library (SSL), contains over 3,400 full-text journal articles, book chapters, reports, and working papers in anthropology, economics, history, philosophy, social psychology, sociology and political science. It also includes full bibliographic references (including abstracts) to more than 6,000 additional articles. The SSL is available upon request to those that qualify for access. For people who are not in the recipient countries, a web-based version, with the 10,000+ bibliographic entries, but without the full text PDFs is available on request.

Neva Goodwin

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Neva Goodwin
Born
Neva Goodwin Rockefeller

June 1, 1944 (age 75)
Spouse(s) Walter J. Kaiser
Bruce Mazlish (?–2016; his death)
Children 2
Parent(s) David Rockefeller
Margaret McGrath
Relatives See Rockefeller family

Neva Goodwin Rockefeller (born June 1, 1944) is co-director of the Global Development And Environment Institute (GDAE) at Tufts University, where she is a research associate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy[1] and director of the Social Science Library: Frontier Thinking in Sustainable Development and Human Well-Being.[2]

Goodwin works towards a contextual economics theory that will have more relevance to contemporary real-world social and ecological concerns than does the dominant economic paradigm.[3] To this end, Goodwin is the lead author of two introductory university-level economics textbooks as well as online teaching modules,[4] along with editing two six-part series among other publications (see below).

Goodwin is also involved with efforts to motivate business to recognize social and ecological health as significant, long-term corporate goals. She is involved in socially responsible investing[5] and served in leadership roles at organizations such as, most recently, the New Economy Coalition,[6] Winrock International Institute for Agricultural Development, Ceres, and the Sustainable Endowments Institute.[7][8]

https://www.academia.edu/11911622/Are_Humans_Misfits_in_Market_Democracies_The_Spinach_Pie_Papers_Takeaway_Two

This is the second of a pair of books by Robert Lane. The first was
 After the End of History: The Curious Fate of American Materialism
, published by Michigan Press in2006 as the sixth in a series called
“Evolving Values for a Capitalist World.”
NevaGoodwin was the editor of the series as well as working closely with Lane on these twobooks.
 After the End of History
is now available
as an eBook atAmazon.com.
 I saw how ordinary men were corrupted by opinions of the most foolishkind in every walk of life. I longed to find a remedy more than I hoped forsuccess. And then I believed I had found a means whereby I couldinsinuate myself into those over-indulged souls and cure them by givingthem pleasure. I had often observed how a gay and amusing form ofadvice like this had happy results in many cases.
 – 
Desiderius Erasmus, “Letter to Dorp” (1515)
 on the publication of
 In Praise of Folly
Dedication
To Neva GoodwinEconomist, Ecologist, Editor, and Friend, she first made possible the publication of
 Afterthe End of History
 and then helped me to see
 – 
 and to say
 – 
 what I wanted to say in
 Are Humans Misfits in Market Democracies?
Tolerant of a mix of familiar speech, deviantcharacters, and heterodox ideas, Neva Goodwin has interrupted her own important workto help me pursue my own idiosyncratic telos. I am grateful.Copyright © by Robert E. Lane 2014, all rights reserved
Copy-editor: Samuel Willsea

The Limits to Growth

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The Limits to Growth
Cover first edition Limits to growth.jpg

The Limits to Growth first edition cover.

Spartan Ephors of prudence pass judgement on all and stand above and astride the law. #CovidPurpose #Conquestof Dough

Who are the Priests and the Princes of  Peak oil. There are three Peak Oil subjects, The Narrative Myth, The Actual output and investment figures, & Oil Wars.

Introducing Judith Rodin, 12th President of the Rockefeller Foundation. given a great reference from the CEO of Palantir. #INFOWARS #NWO #YouCOuldntMakeitUp #Event201 Track and Trace is a #Census2021

Hunt’s attempt for a return to stability

Faisal Islam

Economics editor

In about an hour’s time, Jeremy Hunt will become just the second of the last five chancellors to actually hold the famous red box outside Number 11 this morning.

Those five chancellors were in post for less than four years in total, with an average tenure of nine months. But for most of that period the Treasury was run by Rishi Sunak.

The previous five chancellors to them were in place over a 26-year period.

This piece of Westminster trivia points to an important defining piece of context for this Budget statement – the attempt to return to stability after rolling crises.

And the key admission in the Budget documents will be about two structural weaknesses in the UK economy – the size of the workforce, and low business investment.

That lack of normality and stability has had an impact.

Some will blame the corporation tax rises, but they are only just getting going, so can’t be to blame for the recent poor record on investment.

The recent volatility on financial markets after the collapse of some US banks are also pointed to as vindication by some in the Treasury for a tough line on tax and spend, since the mini-Budget.

Long gone are the days of summer, when forecasters were derided by Liz Truss as “declinist bean counters”.

The Office for Budget Responsibility are very much at the centre of things right now, and will deliver an instant verdict on whether the policy changes announced will shift the dial on the economy, or the number of workers.

Article share tools

  • Budget 2021 analysis RISHIS 2021 Budget.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gj_mRTja9xYthM79mxbzeD-bOG3SDTAD/view?usp=sharing

I thought I would add some context to Wednesdays Budget provisions having looked at the
Published detail on the First Homes Help to Buy 95% mortgage provisions. ( which is still
pretty Thin)
This was Property weeks Leader today. I have been disappointed by a monumental lack of
context in analysis from the media , the industry and of course from the chancellor and the
treasury itself. As Property Week States, this budget upon reflection and at first blush is
the Ultimate Fudge!
https://www.propertyweek.com/news/real-estate-is-on-the-cusp-of-a-data-paradigm-shift/
5112971.article ?
“Throw in the mix the chancellor’s failure to abolish empty
business rates and the landlords, ever typecast as villains
of the piece (more parallels with Dickensian times), come
even closer to joining the ranks of the poor, when they
are just as important as their tenants to the recovery and
reinvention of the high street. “Where’s the justice in
that?” asks Shopkeepers’ Campaign CEO Vivienne King.

“Where indeed? As for the stamp duty holiday extension, will it really make that much of a
difference? There is a danger that along with the reintroduction of 95% mortgages (this
time government-backed), it will just drive up demand and with it house prices (bubble
alert) – making it easier for rich kids who are looking to buy their first homes, but not for
working class folk like my friend, who recently sold her flat for a tidy profit but has decided
not to buy a new home for the time being as prices have gone up far more than the stamp
duty saving she would have made. In short, what should be a buyer’s market looks as
though it is turning into a seller’s one – unless you’re well-off.”
Liz Hamson
https://www.propertyweek.com/leader-and-blogs/the-ultimate-fudge-it-budget/
5112988.article

There is much that can not be given a context ( ESG is still very much off the public radar)
in the budget but, we can certainly provide context for the First Time Buyer Help to buy
provisions . So here is some context to those help to buy mortgage provisions having
looked at the Published detail ( which is still pretty Thin)
Details of New First Time Buyer Scheme.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/965665/210301_Budget_Supplementary_Doc_-
_mortgage_guarantee_scheme.pdf
1. “The scheme is intended as a temporary measure. It will be open for new mortgage
applications from April 2021 to December 2022, in line with the government’s view that the
current scarcity of high loan-to-value lending is primarily a response to the pandemic
rather than a symptom of a longer-term structural change in the mortgage market.”

2. Scale of scheme 3.14
There will be a cap on the size of the government’s contingent liability under the scheme
of £3.9 billion. However, the cap is set so as not to constrain the ability of lenders to
access the scheme.

Mortgage eligibility
3.7 The scheme is designed to help creditworthy households struggling to save for the
higher
mortgage by lenders in the current environment. For this reason, a mortgage
eligible for a guarantee under the scheme will need to:
• be a residential mortgage (not second homes) and not buy-to-let
• be taken out by an individual or individuals rather than an incorporated company
• be on a property in the UK with purchase value of £600,000 or less
• have a loan-to-value of between 91 percent and 95 per cent
• be originated between the dates specified by the scheme
• be a repayment mortgage and not interest-only and
• meet standard requirements in terms of the assessment of the borrower’s ability to pay
the mortgage, for example a loan-to-income and credit score test

Contingent Liability Cap of 3.9 billion (put into context of 2019 figures)

£3.9 bn is 14.25 % of the overall underwritten total so 27.37 billion of Lending is
theoretically possible under the Government guarantee from April 2021 to December
2022,
£27.37 billion over 21 months or 15.64 billion per annum
in 2019 total Mortgages for all purposes and all lenders amounted to £233 billion this is
well within the hard capped 15% macro prudential ceiling at 6.71%. £ 15.64 billion out or
£ 233Billion at 2019 levels of lending.
Looked at this way it seems less than ambitious and at the same time ridiculously
over optimistic. Otherwise known as Absurd.
At an average of 200,000 per mortgage that would be 78,200 homes the average loan size
in 2019 was £171,863 which would give a max theoretical take up of 91,000 homes.

In its valedictory, sorry, ( Chapter 1 introduction) The treasury briefing note offers us this
context.
(“1.3 In 2013 the government launched the Help to Buy: Mortgage Guarantee scheme in
response to a similar shortage in the availability of high LTV products following the 2008
financial crisis. That scheme was a success. The number of products available at 95% LTV
increased from October 2013 to June 2017 from 43 to 261 (1). The scheme also directly
helped over 100,000 households to buy their own home across the United
Kingdom.”
Thats around 25,000 households p.a?(ed.) The current scheme has capacity to be 3
times as successful? How likely is that?

total mortgage lending under the Macro prudential rules would have to amount to £182.45
billion for this to be 15% of the total bank lending for Higher LTV lending. In 2019 total
lending on all types of mortgages was 233 Billion see sheet 3 summary of Mortgage
approvals.

The context does point to this being window dressing.
The ability and the appetite for Mortgage lenders to access the Scheme are different
questions and the Likely unavailability of Higher multiple joint incomes as well as the
Lower deposit requirement is still a key factor and will limit take up in my opinion.
Will banks lend to this end of the market even with either a Government guarantee or with
an Insurance backed private sector guarantee? What are the key deterrents?
1. Risk of Negative equity.
2. Smaller loan sizes and smaller fees so less profitable
3. remortgage and more established borrower market a better application of available
capital ( The banks are still balance sheet impaired, in truth since 2008)
4. Employment loss risk factors?
I can’t help thinking that the balance of the Governments Build Back Better and Build Build
Build Policy framework is much more supportive or conducive to Build to rent and
particularly the 3rd Sector Social housing for profit sectors? The context of the
Environmental and Sustainability Governance (ESG) frameworks are key here , they are
advisory at this stage but I expect to see a large push at COP26 for making these matters
official and we hear a lot from Mark Carney on these matters and from the Large Trans
Global Corporate sector also?
This response https://www.ukgbc. to the budget from this under the radar “3rd Sector”
leads to a whole slew of under the radar measures and metrics which I think we need to
figure into our own analysis of the as yet undefined and undeclared market policy context
we will be selling into going forward.
This part of the Net Zero 2050 agenda is ill defined , woolly and a triumph of Wishful
thinking and idealism over common sense.
The Property Week Tells us today.

I have added a further open source Folder for some key components of the ESG
context. https://drive.google.
The Budget Statement and also the Published details of the new First Homes policy are
still but half the story I think.
My own view is that the new rule book is yet to be published and the fiscal context of this
Budget is unknown until the Banking system comes out from its hibernation period during
the past 12 months. Will the new Rule book be published this spring and early summer at
the G7 or will we have to wait for Cop26 in November?
That’s my current coordinates I wish I had some sense of the sensible vector to adopt
going forward but it seems that insufficient information is available to make a call at this
point.
Our Series On Affordable Mortgages and Mortgage Origination bears reading, the lack of
context given by either the chancellor or the Media coverage as ever sees much more
heat than light being generated as the teenage scribblers ( and those who should know
better) continue to shoot from the lip.

The Budget ( Treasury ( Kakistocracy ) and the Kleptocracy ( ESG bandits of the Green Fascist Mafia)

The Budget is basically the Looters Manifesto. ( Austerity for thee and me, !)

 

https://www.hl.co.uk/shares/corporate-bonds-gilts/bond-prices/gbp-bonds

https://www.hl.co.uk/shares/shares-search-results/b/barclays-bank-plc-9-permanent-int-bonds

Introducing Judith Rodin, 12th President of the Rockefeller Foundation. given a great reference from the CEO of Palantir. #INFOWARS #NWO #YouCOuldntMakeitUp #Event201 Track and Trace is a #Census2021

ITS ALL DONE WITH SWAPS. TTIP , AADHAAR , THE DEHLI FARMER PROTESTS #ID2022

Project Cabal ( sorry Syndicate ) The in house Magazine of the Global Elite, Turning up the Heat!

https://www.ukcolumn.org/writer/simon-elmer

First, let me tell you about the event.

The event is one of those all-day conferences, with panels and breakout groups and all that. It’s hosted by a group called Real Left, formerly Left Lockdown Sceptics. They’re calling it “The Left Case Against the World Economic Forum.” I’m on a panel with Dr. Fabio Vighi, Professor of Critical Theory and Italian at Cardiff University. It’s just the two of us. We’re the panel. We probably won’t be talking about the WEF very much, or not specifically about the WEF. We’ll mostly be talking about global capitalism, which is what I want your feedback on.

The other speakers on the other panels are:

Cory Morningstar, an independent investigative journalist, writer and environmental activist. You probably know her work from Wrong Kind of Green.

Paul Cudenec, an anarchist writer in the organic radical tradition who runs an outfit called Winter Oak.

Piers Corbyn, physicist, meteorologist, activist, notorious UK “thoughtcriminal”, and Jeremy’s brother.

Vikki Spit, the first person to receive compensation for the loss of a loved one (i.e., her fiancée) killed by one of the “Covid vaccines” from the UK Vaccine Damages Payment Scheme.

And some other folks. The line-up is still being finalized. The details are here on the Real Left website. There aren’t any names or any biographical information on the site, so I assume Real Left is some sort of nefarious “Covid-denying, conspiracy-theorizing, Putin-loving, democracy-threatening, far-right, anti-vax” leftist outfit that is plotting to storm the House of Commons, or Buckingham Palace, or whatever it is one storms in the United Kingdom.

 

A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Systemic Collapse and Pandemic Simulation

 

We Need to Talk About Mr. Global – Part Three

https://www.youtube.com/@TrishWoodisCritical/videos

Just to come full Circle, John Tius and Catherine Austin Fitts in Conversation

SOLARI REPORT MONEY MARKETS MARCH 2, 2023 WITH CATHERINE AUSTIN FITTS JOHN TITUS.

 

 

https://youtube.com/live/9uRyXsh2feQ

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Author: rogerglewis

Real Estate Entrepreneur. http://www.realrld.com/

1 thought on “Flu d’état, Part 2. Central Bank Coup Det Tat. The Central Bank Balance Sheet Pandemic. OCTOBER 3, 2021 #Covidstroika ITS A DIGITAL BANK PASSPORT NOT A VACCINE PASSPORT #QED.”

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